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"U.S. Stymies Detainee Access Despite Ruling, Lawyers Say"
Washington Post
October 14, 2004
Carol Leonnig
More than three months after the Supreme
Court declared that hundreds of detainees at
the military prison at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, have the right to challenge their
imprisonment in U.S. courts, none has
appeared in a courtroom.
Of the 68 alleged al Qaeda and Taliban
fighters who have so far petitioned for
access to federal court in Washington, only a
handful have even spoken to their lawyers.
With some held for nearly three years on the
U.S. Navy base, the detainees remain largely
precluded from receiving legal help because
of protracted negotiations with the Justice
Department over lawyers' security
clearances, the government's insistence on
monitoring attorney-client conversations and
the number of visits lawyers will be allowed,
defense attorneys told a U.S. District Court
judge yesterday.
Less than half the detainees with lawyers
have been given the government's reason for
holding them; the government has broken a
court-ordered Sept. 30 deadline to justify
most of those detentions, the lawyers said.
For the 28 detainees who have been
informed, the reason is typically that a
recent military review-conducted without
an attorney or witnesses-has concluded
that they are enemy combatants with links to
the Taliban or al Qaeda.
The Justice Department, when ordered this
month by a federal judge to formally
respond to detainees' basic complaint that
they are being unfairly imprisoned, filed a
96-page pleading asking the judge to dismiss
the case. The document contained some of
the same arguments made by government
lawyers in their losing case before the
Supreme Court.
"The government says it's very complicated,
they need security clearance issues worked
out, et cetera, et cetera," said Don Rehkopf,
a military law expert with the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
and the attorney who helped get espionage
charges against a serviceman at Guantanamo
Bay dismissed. "That's garbage. The
government is coming up with more and
more excuses, and changing the rules on a
daily basis."
Justice Department attorney Terry Henry
yesterday told a federal judge overseeing the
cases that the government has worked to be
"reasonable and fair."
"We think we're making extraordinary
strides to have these folks have their day in
court," Henry said.
The Supreme Court ruled June 28 that
foreign nationals held at a U.S. military
prison had some of the same rights as U.S.
citizens imprisoned on other charges: to file
a habeas petition and demand that the
government justify the reason for detaining
them.
In habeas cases, legal scholars and criminal
defense lawyers said, a person who petitions
the court for this information typically
receives an answer within 30 days or is
released.
Yet that fairly mundane legal step,
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conducted hundreds of times every day in
courthouses around the country, has been
transformed-against the backdrop of a war
on terrorism and a presidential campaign
focused on the administration's handling of
that war-into a conflict that legal scholars
call unprecedented.
"It's definitely ugly," said Douglas W.
Kmiec, a professor of constitutional law at
Pepperdine University Law School and a
Justice Department official in the Reagan
and George H.W. Bush administrations.
"But it seems like the time we live in. It is
simultaneously outrageous if it's a time of
peace and totally reasonable if it's a time of
war."
Hearing the cases is a retired senior judge,
U.S. District Judge Joyce Hens Green, who
is long on expertise in national security
cases but short on time, staff or a clear
mandate on how to handle them.
Tom Wilner, an attorney who represents 12
Kuwaitis and who brought the case that led
to the Supreme Court decision, complained
to Green yesterday that the government has
stonewalled, violated her orders and is now
in contempt of the nation's highest court. In
a letter to Green last month, the detainee
lawyers said that efforts to represent their
clients had hit a roadblock since she was
appointed.
"Why is it after three years, they can't say
why they are holding these people?" Wilner
asked yesterday. "We've had people rotting
in prison, so we don't need any more delay. .
. . The Supreme Court has spoken. Nothing
has happened yet."
Green disagreed. "I beg your pardon," she
said. "Things have happened."
Detainee lawyers said they cannot
understand why some apparently dangerous
detainees have been released while others
who have not shown evidence of violence
have not been set free. A former detainee
who was recently released from
Guantanamo Bay is now believed to be the
leader of a militant band that kidnapped two
Chinese engineers in a lawless region of
Pakistan near the Afghanistan border,
according to Pakistani officials.
Experts in military law and habeas cases
said the obstacles in the Guantanamo Bay
detainee cases stem from three main
complications. Most notably, the lawyers do
not have access to their clients, particularly
in the new, closed military hearings the
government inaugurated after the Supreme
Court decision to determine whether
individuals should continue to be classified
as enemy combatants and detained. The
plaintiffs do not have the information to
make their case to the tribunal, which gives
the government a lopsided advantage.
"When the detainees are denied meaningful
access to counsel, the adversarial process is
lost," said David P. Sheldon, a military law
expert.
The U.S. District Court also stumbled for
several weeks in deciding whether one judge
would oversee the cases or whether some
matters should be left to individual judges
who initially presided over separate cases.
At least three times, judges have decided not
to rule on motions filed by lawyers in the
detainee cases, saying they were deferring to
the coordinating judge, and thus causing
additional delay.
Some lawyers also lacked needed security
clearances or expertise in military and
habeas law, and some only recently began to
apply to visit the base. "We're working as
fast as we can, given the circumstances,"
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Justice Department spokesman Mark
Corallo said.
The war on terrorism also prompts the court
to move slowly and deferentially when the
government says the nation's safety is at
stake.
Scholars disagree about how clear the
Supreme Court ruling was. Many believe it
promised detainees full rights to courts and
all the due process the system provides.
Kmiec said the decision was not so clear and
gave the Justice Department room to argue
that closed military review hearings are
sufficient to determine the reason to hold
detainees.
"They may have a good legal argument,"
Kmiec said of the government claim that the
detainees do not need lawyers at those
hearings. "But as a citizen, I always want
my government to act on a plane higher than
the minimum of what the law requires."
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"Guantanamo Trial Is Ruled Unlawful"
Los Angeles Times
November 9, 2004
John Hendren
The first military commission trial at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, was halted Monday
after a federal judge here ruled the
proceedings invalid under U.S. and
international law-dealing a blow to the
legal process set up by the Bush
administration to handle accused terrorists.
The case against Salim Ahmed Hamdan was
suspended after U.S. District Judge James
Robertson ruled that the Yemeni man had
been denied due process.
The ruling affects all of the nearly 500
detainees from Afghanistan at Guantanamo.
"The practical outcome of this is that the
government is not going to be able to
maintain this system," said Eric M.
Freedman, a Hofstra University law school
professor who has challenged the military
commissions in court on behalf of two
detainees.
Robertson ruled that the Bush administration
had not followed a lawful procedure in
declaring Hamdan an "enemy combatant"
who was not entitled to protections and
privileges under the Geneva Convention.
The "combatant status review tribunals"-
used by the Pentagon to decide whether to
hold detainees-are not a "competent" court
to make such a determination, Robertson
said. And the military commission process,
which prosecutes detainees using secret
evidence and unnamed witnesses, "could not
be countenanced in any American court,"
the judge ruled.
"The government has asserted a position
starkly different from the positions and
behavior of the United States in previous
conflicts, one that can only weaken the
United States' own ability to demand
application of the Geneva Conventions to
Americans captured during armed conflicts
abroad," wrote Robertson, who served as a
lieutenant in the Navy between 1959 and
1964 and was appointed a judge in 1994 by
President Clinton.
To correct the system, Robertson said, the
government must recognize the detainces as
prisoners of war under the Geneva
Convention until it has a legally valid way to
declare they are not.
In order to comply with Robertson's ruling,
the government would have to grant
Hamdan access to all commission sessions,
witnesses and evidence against him. The
judge said the government could try
detainees in courts-martial, used for crimes
involving the military and those held under
military control.
The Justice Department, which is handling
the administration's case, said it would
appeal the ruling. Spokesman Mark Corallo
said lawyers would apply for an emergency
stay.
The government said Robertson's ruling ran
counter to the established war powers of the
president and that President Bush had
properly determined that the Geneva
Convention did not apply to a terrorist
organization such as Al Qaeda.
"The process struck down by the district
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court today was carefully crafted to protect
America from terrorists while affording
those charged with violations of the laws of
war with fair process, and the department
will make every effort to have this process
restored through appeal," Corallo said.
Hamdan, captured in Afghanistan in late
2001, was one of Al Qaeda leader Osama
bin Laden's drivers. He was sent to the U.S.
naval base at Guantanamo Bay in 2002, and
contested his detention earlier this year.
Civil rights groups and defendants' lawyers
have opposed both forms of justice devised
by the administration. The combatant status
review tribunals have been widely criticized
because they deny the prisoners access to
lawyers and use as evidence Bush's
determination that all detainees at
Guantanamo are enemy combatants.
"The president," Robertson wrote in his
opinion, "is not a 'tribunal,' however."
Defense lawyers have complained that the
military commission trials allow the use of
hearsay evidence not permitted in other
courts, and allow the use of secret evidence
against defendants.
Some of them predicted that the
administration would be forced to alter the
system.
"Their practical options are limited to
appealing this ruling or abolishing the
system of military commissions that they
have established to date," Freedman said.
"Otherwise we're going to be litigating
against them for the next 50 years."
Robertson's ruling added to a growing
chorus of judges dissenting from the Bush
administration's stance, said Eugene R.
Fidell, a Harvard Law School instructor.
"It's potentially a very serious challenge to
military commissions," said Fidell, who also
is president of the National Assn. of Military
Justice, a nonprofit group of lawyers
working within the military justice system.
"What it is, in fact, is kind of a slow-motion
revolt on the part of the district judges. One
after another, the district judges have shown
impatience with the kinds of positions the
government has taken."
Prior to Monday's ruling, the Bush
administration's once-ambitious plans to try
the detainees already had bogged down.
Fifteen detainees were part of the first group
designated to face tribunals; authorities so
far have dealt with only four cases.
After the first set of preliminary hearings in
August, chief prosecutor Army Col. Robert
Swann had predicted charges would be filed
against high-profile terrorists.
But those charges-presumably against
figures such as Khalid Shaikh Mohammed,
the alleged planner of the Sept. 11 attacks,
or Ramzi Binalshibh, the Yemeni who
allegedly was his accomplice-never
materialized.
The process has encountered problems
ranging from legal challenges to simple
translation difficulties.
The military commission consists of five
members and an alternate who serve as both
judge and jury.
However, three of the panel members were
removed last month after defense lawyers
challenged them over apparent conflicts of
interest.
Now, proceedings that have faced
increasingly intense criticism from human
583
rights groups and U.S. allies such as Britain
and Australia have again been sent back to
the drawing board.
A number of advocacy groups praised the
ruling.
"Today's decision sends a clear message that
the fight against terrorism does not give the
government license to disregard domestic
and international law," said Anthony D.
Romero, executive director of the American
Civil Liberties Union.
Jamie Fellner, director of the U.S. program
of Human Rights Watch, agreed.
"This ruling should put the final nail into the
coffin of the military commissions," Fellner
said. "They should never have been created
in the first place, and their implementation
has been a disaster."
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"Gonzales & the War"
National Review
July 8, 2005
Andrew McCarthy
In the wake of the London bombings, we
cannot help but remember that our war
against Islamofascists will be a long one and
that, for us, the main imperatives for the
foreseeable future will be (a) neutralizing
terrorists so they cannot return to the battle
and attack us, and (b) maximizing our ability
to reap intelligence-the precious
information that is our only hope of
preventing future Londons, future Madrids
and future 9/11s.
In that light, as President Bush considers
candidates for the Supreme Court, it would
simply be irresponsible for fans of Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales-including NRO
and others among us who strongly supported
his confirmation (see here and here)-not to
take heed of the recusal issue that has been
raised with great persuasive force by Ed
Whelan and Ramesh Ponnuru. For it is
certain that issues crucial to the war on
terror are headed straight for the high
Court's lap in the very near future, and
national security desperately needs a strong
voice, not an empty seat.
It was only a little over a year ago that the
Supreme Court ruled on two controversial
cases involving unlawful enemy combatants:
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Rasul v. Bush. (For a
full outline, see here.) In Hamdi, a bare
majority of the justices (including Justice
O'Connor, who wrote the Court's opinion)
held that the president was empowered to
detain without trial as an enemy combatant
an American citizen who had taken up arms
against the United States, and that, though
such a citizen would be permitted to
challenge his detention in court, the habeas
corpus proceeding at which that would be
done could be very deferential to the
executive branch. At least four justices
(Scalia, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg) were
prepared to hold the detention illegal and/or
to reject deference to the executive branch in
the ensuing hearing.
Worse, in Rasul, the Court held 6-3 (with
Justice O'Connor again in the majority) that
the alien enemy combatants detained
overseas in wartime and held outside (or
what was up until then regarded as outside)
the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts were
permitted to challenge their detentions in
federal court.
Significantly, the Court held that its ruling
was based not on the Constitution but on the
habeas-corpus statute-which means that
this madness could be ended tomorrow if
Congress fixed the statute to make clear that
it is not intended to allow the enemy to use
our own courts against us as a weapon of
war. As Congress has contented itself to
stay on the sidelines, however, Rasul
promised to be profoundly troublesome-
and it has more than delivered on that
promise.
Exactly what kind of procedures and
protections are our enemies entitled to in
these unprecedented court proceedings? Do
they get counsel? Do they get discovery-
including battlefield intelligence? Are these
to be full-blown trials in which we take
soldiers off the battlefield so that they can
testify about the circumstances of the
particular enemy combatant's apprehension
during this firefight or that? How much, in
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the middle of a war, should federal judges
be able to second-guess commanders in the
field? If the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts
now extends to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
why shouldn't it extend to Baghdad, or
Kandahar, or anyplace else on the globe
where American forces are in de facto
control of foreign territory? Are the foreign
terrorists entitled to Geneva Convention
protections even though they themselves
pervert the laws and customs of war?
The answer to these and other questions is:
We don't know. The Supreme Court
provided precious little guidance in Hamdi
and Rasul, and Congress has not intervened,
so the lower courts are on their own:
fashioning new procedures and answering
legal questions as they arise, ad hoc. Cases
are making their way up the system's
chain-and they may land in the Supreme
Court's lap as early as next term.
As I've previously detailed here, last
November a federal district court in
Washington, D.C., boldly extended prisoner-
of-war safeguards to al Qaeda operative
Salim Ahmed Hamdan (reputed to be Osama
bin Laden's driver) who is currently being
held in Guantanamo Bay. To do so, the
judge not only had to rewrite the Geneva
Conventions into something vastly different
from the treaty ratified by the United States
in 1949. He also had to ignore that the U.S.
has considered and has-for over a quarter-
century-expressly refused to ratify a treaty
(the 1977 Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions) that would grant POW
protections to non-state militias.
That case is now on appeal, and undoubtedly
heading for the Supreme Court-where
some of the very justices who seem most
comfortable with extending privileges to the
enemy during wartime have also recently
taken to citing unratified treaties (not to
mention other varieties of foreign law) as
authority for some of their rulings.
Moreover, in an earlier case that is also part
of the Rasul fallout, last October another
district judge in Washington ruled in Odah
v. United States that alien enemy
combatants-unlike the vast majority of
American prisoners who file habeas-corpus
petitions-are entitled to have counsel paid
for by the U.S. taxpayers they are trying to
kill in order to challenge their detention by
our military in their war against us.
These cases are immensely important to
national security and the war on terror.
They may only be the tip of the iceberg.
And they will come before a Supreme Court
that already sports blocs of justices
hospitable to both the notion of enhanced
due process for terrorists and the imposition
on Americans of elite international
sensibilities that have won neither adoption
in the manner prescribed by the constitution
nor popular favor.
But they would almost certainly not come
before a Justice Gonzales. As the
president's chief counsel, and now as
attorney general, he has, to his great credit,
been a key architect of the Bush
administration's aggressive policies for
combating international terror networks. It
is difficult to see how he could avoid having
to recuse himself from the resulting cases-
not just Hamdan and Odah but the others
that are sure to follow.
President Bush has quite appropriately made
national security the defining issue of his
presidency. It remains the defining issue
even as he considers court vacancies. So he
must ask himself: Are there five reliable
votes on the Supreme Court in favor of
national security? Are there five votes
against the judicial weaving from whole
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cloth of a new set of deferential due-process
norms for international terrorists?
The answer is clearly "no." As long as it is,
the president needs to choose a justice who
will not only stand firm, but one who can
actually hear the cases.
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"Ruling Lets U.S. Restart Trials at Guantanamo"
New York Times
July
Neil
16, 2005
A. Lewis
A federal appeals court ruled unanimously
on Friday that the military could resume war
crimes trials of terrorism suspects at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, which were
suspended last year.
The decision, by a three-judge panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, reversed a
lower court's ruling that abruptly halted the
first war crimes trials conducted by the
United States since the aftermath of World
War II. The appeals judges said the Bush
administration's plan to try some detainees
before military commissions did not violate
the Constitution, international law or
American military law.
Their ruling, in the case of Salim Ahmed
Hamdan, a driver for Osama bin Laden, was
a significant legal victory for the
administration, which has found itself
engaged in several court battles over tools
that officials say they need to fight terrorist
groups.
"The president's authority under the laws of
our nation to try enemy combatants is a vital
part of the global war on terror," Attorney
General Alberto R. Gonzales said on Friday,
"and today's decision reaffirms this critical
authority,"
Neal K. Katyal, a Georgetown University
law professor who represented Mr. Hamdan,
said he would consider an appeal.
"Today's ruling," Mr. Katyal said, "places
absolute trust in the president, unchecked by
the Constitution, statutes of Congress and
longstanding treaties ratified by the Senate
of the United States."
He noted that many retired senior officers
who had signed a brief supporting his
position maintained that the way detainees at
Guantanamo had been treated imperiled
American troops who might themselves be
captured on the battlefield.
Military officials have said in recent weeks
that they are eager and ready to resume the
trial of Mr. Hamdan. At a Senate hearing on
Thursday, Brig. Gen. Thomas L.
Hemingway, the Air Force officer who
supervises the military commission process,
and Daniel J. Dell'Orto, the Pentagon's
principal deputy general counsel, both said
they expected war crimes trials to resume
within 30 to 45 days if the appeals court
ruled in their favor.
Of more than 500 detainees remaining at
Guantanamo, Mr. Hamdan is one of four
who have so far been charged with war
crimes. Twelve others have been designated
by President Bush as eligible for trial, and
military officials have suggested that they
are prepared to bring charges against dozens
of other prisoners there should the president
designate them as well.
Mr. Hamdan, a 35-year-old Yemeni who
was captured in Afghanistan, is charged
with conspiracy to commit attacks on
civilians, murder and terrorism. He has
argued through his lawyers that although he
served as a driver for Mr. bin Laden, he was
not a member of Al Qaeda and never took
up arms against Americans or their allies.
He was sitting in a Guantanamo courtroom
when the proceedings in his case were
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suddenly halted Nov. 8 by the earlier court
decision, issued by James Robertson, a
federal district judge in Washington.
Judge Robertson ruled that the military
commissions violated the Geneva
Conventions, the principal international laws
of war, to which the United States is a
signatory; violated the Constitution,
because, he said, the president did not have
the necessary authority from Congress; and
violated the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, which, he said, requires that
detainees be tried under the same conditions
as American soldiers who are court-
martialed.
In Friday's decision, written by Judge A.
Raymond Randolph, the appeals court
rejected all three rationales, with
occasionally disdainful language.
The court said it was well established that
the Geneva Conventions "do not create
judicially enforceable rights"-that is,
accusations of a violation may not be
brought in a lawsuit.
The appeals panel also held that Judge
Robertson had been incorrect in maintaining
that Congress had not authorized Mr. Bush
to set up the commissions. Congress gave
him the authority to do so, the panel said, in
three resolutions dealing with terrorism. In
one, the lawmakers authorized the president
"to use all necessary and appropriate force"
against anyone who had abetted the Sept. 11
attacks, and granted him the authority to act
to prevent international acts of terrorism.
In addition, the appeals court said the
commissions were not bound by the rules of
courts-martial, like allowing for defendants
to be present at all times. In the earlier
decision, Judge Robertson noted that Mr.
Hamdan had been excluded from the
Guantanamo courtroom for some of the
proceedings after the military commission's
chief judge determined that classified
information was likely to be exposed.
The three judges who issued the ruling were
all nominated to the bench by Republican
presidents. Judge Randolph, chosen by the
first President Bush, was joined in the
decision by Judges John Roberts, nominated
by the current president, and Stephen F.
Williams, by President Ronald Reagan.
Judge Robertson, of the lower court, was
nominated by President Bill Clinton.
The war crimes commissions are one of
three types of legal bodies created by the
military to deal with detainees at
Guantanamo.
The first, called combatant status review
tribunals, made up of three-officer panels,
considered the cases of all the Guantanamo
detainees to determine if they had been
properly deemed unlawful enemy
combatants, who, the military said, could be
held there indefinitely. Those tribunals
found that all but 33 of more than 560
detainees then at Guantanamo had been
properly imprisoned.
This year the military began a second set of
proceedings for the remaining detainees,
now numbering about 520. In these
proceedings, before "administrative review
boards," panels of three officers are asked to
determine if the detainee is no longer a
threat and thus may be eligible for release.
No figures from those deliberations have
been announced.
Separately, nearly 200 of the Guantanamo
prisoners are represented in lawsuits in
federal court. Those actions were made
possible by a Supreme Court ruling in June
2004 that detainees could use the civilian
court system to challenge their
imprisonment.
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War on Terror
Part II: Hamdi and Padilla
"Bush's Good Day in Court"
Washington Post
August 4, 2004
David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey
The three "war-on-terrorism cases" decided
by the Supreme Court at the close of its term
in June have been portrayed-especially
overseas-as significant defeats for the
Bush administration. This is largely because
the court ruled, over the administration's
strong objections, that the men, now held as
al Qaeda and Taliban members at the
Guantanamo Bay naval station in Cuba,
may challenge their detention through the
federal courts.
But in fact, when all these cases are read
together-the Guantanamo Bay case, along
with the court's decisions in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld and Rumsfeld v. Padilla (both
involving American citizens held in the
United States as captured enemy
combatants they mark a significant
reaffirmation of the president's
constitutional authority as commander in
chief in time of war.
In the context of these cases, the court
accepted the following critical propositions:
that the United States is engaged in a legally
cognizable armed conflict with al Qaeda and
the Taliban, to which the laws of war apply;
that "enemy combatants" captured in the
context of that conflict can be held
"indefinitely" without criminal trial while
that conflict continues; that American
citizens (at least those captured overseas)
can be classified and detained as enemy
combatants, confirming the authority of the
court's 1942 decision in Ex Parte Quirin (the
"Nazi saboteur" case); and that the role of
the courts in reviewing such designations is
limited. All these points had been disputed
by one or more of the detainees' lawyers,
and all are now settled in the government's
favor.
Of course, in upholding the executive's
actions on these fundamental points, the
justices also made clear that from here on
out, the courts will have a role, however
circumscribed it might be, in individual
cases. In this, the recent war-on-terrorism
decisions are not unlike the court's
groundbreaking case of Marbury v. Madison
(1803), in which Chief Justice John
Marshall avoided an open clash with
President Thomas Jefferson (by refusing to
order the delivery of a judicial commission
signed at the last minute by a departing John
Adams), but in doing so established the
principle of judicial review. For good or ill,
the camel now does not just have its nose
under the tent, it is comfortably seated at the
table. Whether it will dominate the
conversation, however, remains to be seen.
Much will depend on the president's future
actions.
In a plurality opinion delivered in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, the most important of the many
opinions and dissents issued in these cases,
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Justice Sandra Day O'Connor made clear
that although the principles of due process
may require that captured al Qaeda and
Taliban operatives be given the opportunity
to challenge the factual basis of their
classification as enemy combatants, this
process need not involve the civilian courts.
It can take place before a military panel,
patterned on the "Article V" procedure
established pursuant to the Third Geneva
Convention, dealing with the rights of
"prisoners of war." Significantly, O'Connor
did not suggest that the Geneva Conventions
could or should apply in these circumstances
but found the U.S. Army regulations
implementing this provision to be a useful
model.
The Pentagon was quick to accept
O'Connor's invitation and has already
established a process whereby the
Guantanamo detainees can be heard. In this
connection, however, it is important to note
the burden of proof that the government will
have to meet in any further judicial review.
This point has received almost no comment,
but it is probably the most important
practical aspect of the rulings. To "prove" a
captive is an enemy combatant, the
government need only present "credible
evidence." Once this is accomplished, the
burden shifts to the detainee-who must
then prove that he was not 'affiliated with
either al Qaeda or the Taliban. As all trial
lawyers know, cases are won and lost on the
burden of proof, and the court has (properly,
we believe) given the United States a very
considerable advantage here.
There are, of course, many issues that the
court did not answer in these cases,
including how soon after capture the right to
challenge one's enemy combatant
classification becomes effective; whether an
American citizen captured in the United
States, such as the alleged "dirty bomber"
Jose Padilla, can be detained as an enemy
combatant; and whether enemy combatants
can be tried and criminally punished (rather
than simply held until the conflict ends) by
military commission. The reaffirmation of
Ex Parte Quirin in Justice O'Connor's
opinion, which appears to command at least
a five-member majority on this point,
suggests that they can be so tried.
Nevertheless, because of the shifting nature
of the court's majority on many of these
issues, there is little doubt there will be more
terrorism-related cases in the Supreme
Court's next term. Overall, though, the
executive branch has done very well so far
and, assuming a fair and transparent
processing of the detainees by the military
justice system, should continue to do so in
the future.
The writers are Washington lawyers who
served in the Justice Department during the
administrations of Ronald Reagan and
George H.W. Bush.
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"U.S., Bowing to Court Ruling, Will Free 'Enemy Combatant"'
New York Times
September 23, 2004
Eric Lichtblau
Yaser E. Hamdi, an American citizen
captured in Afghanistan and once deemed so
dangerous that the American military held
him incommunicado for more than two
years as an enemy combatant, will be freed
and allowed to return to Saudi Arabia in the
next few days, officials said Wednesday.
After weeks of negotiations over his release,
lawyers for the Justice Department and Mr.
Hamdi announced an agreement requiring
him to renounce his American citizenship.
The agreement also bars him from leaving
Saudi Arabia for a time and requires him to
report possible terrorist activity, his lawyer
said, although legal analysts said the
arrangement would be difficult for the
United States to enforce.
The agreement was driven by a Supreme
Court decision in June. In the ruling, a
major setback for the Bush administration,
the court found that Mr. Hamdi and enemy
combatants like him had to be given the
chance to challenge their detention. The
court declared that "a state of war is not a
blank check for the president." The
administration decided that rather than give
Mr. Hamdi a hearing, it would simply
negotiate his release.
Mr. Hamdi will probably be flown back to
Saudi Arabia on an American military
aircraft by early next week, said a
government official who asked not to be
identified. Although Mr. Hamdi was born in
1980 in Louisiana, where his father worked
for an oil company, the family left the
United States when he was a toddler and
returned to Saudi Arabia. He lived there
most of his life, and most of his family
remains there.
The agreement freeing Mr. Hamdi reflects a
striking reversal in a hotly debated test case
regarding the limits of the Bush
administration's powers in its pursuit of
terror suspects.
Mr. Hamdi was captured on the battlefield in
Afghanistan in late 2001 after the fall of the
Taliban and imprisoned by the American
military, first at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba
and most recently in a Navy brig in South
Carolina. But the military gave few details
about his suspected links to the Taliban, and
the discovery that he was born in Louisiana
and retained his American citizenship set off
a public debate about his rights to due
process and the government's power to
incarcerate prisoners in wartime.
The Bush administration declared Mr.
Hamdi an enemy combatant and denied him
the chance to contest the accusations against
him at a judicial hearing. He has been held
in solitary confinement and was denied
access to a lawyer until recently, in part
because of what officials described as
national security concerns.
In a statement Wednesday announcing the
agreement to free Mr. Hamdi, the Justice
Department said: "Like many other enemy
combatants captured and detained by U.S.
anned forces in Afghanistan who have been
subsequently released, the United States has
determined that Mr. Hamdi could be
transferred out of United States custody
subject to strict conditions that ensure the
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interests of the United States and our
national security. As we have repeatedly
stated, the United States has no interest in
detaining enemy combatants beyond the
point that they pose a threat to the U.S. and
our allies."
One final point of discussion resulted in the
agreement to have Mr. Hamdi renounce any
claims to his American citizenship upon his
arrival in Saudi Arabia, where he remains a
citizen.
The citizenship issue was not a terribly
important one to Mr. Hamdi, his lawyer,
Frank W. Dunham Jr., said in an interview.
"He has always thought of himself as a
Saudi citizen, and he wasn't willing to spend
an extra day in jail over it," Mr. Dunham
said.
Travel arrangements for Mr. Hamdi's return
are still being completed, officials said. But
Mr. Dunham said that "as long as they put
him in civilian clothes and don't put a bag
over his head and give him some ice cream
for the ride, I don't care how they get him
back there."
When Mr. Hamdi was told in recent days
that he was on the verge of release, he
smiled and said, "That's what I'm talking
about!" Mr. Dunham recounted.
Mr. Hamdi will also have to abide by what
the Justice Department described as "strict
travel restrictions" in Saudi Arabia. Mr.
Dunham said the agreement required Mr.
Hamdi to remain within Saudi Arabia for a
set period before being allowed to travel
outside the country, but he would not
discuss precise details because the pact has
not yet been filed in federal court. Saudi
officials were unavailable for comment on
the agreement late Wednesday.
Mr. Hamdi would also be obligated to report
certain suspicious activity, Mr. Dunham
said. "If somebody recruits him to become a
terrorist, he's got to tell somebody that," he
said.
Civil liberties advocates and some legal
analysts said Mr. Hamdi's release
underscored weaknesses in the
administration's rationale for locking up
terror suspects and could have implications
for other suspects held in Cuba and
elsewhere.
"It's quite something for the government to
declare this person one of the worst of the
worst, hold him for almost three years and
then, when they're told by the Supreme
Court to give him a fair hearing, turn around
and give up," said David Cole, a law
professor at Georgetown University who has
been critical of the administration.
Anthony Romero, executive director of the
American Civil Liberties Union, added in an
interview that "this clearly shows that the
government was not able to meet the burden
of proof that the Supreme Court had set for
it, and rather than risk further
embarrassment in a failed prosecution,
they've decided to just send him out of the
country."
"The whole case makes you wonder," he
added, "why was he really being held in the
first place?"
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"Logic of Supreme Court's Decisions Says That
Alleged 'Dirty Bomber' Must be Charged or Freed"
Legal Times
August 2, 2004
Robert A. Levy
The bottom line is: Jose Padilla has to be
released-unless the government somehow
conjures up charges of treason or criminal
acts.
To be sure, the Supreme Court's June 28
opinion in Rumsfeld v. Padilla literally said
nothing of the sort. In fact, it didn't reach
the merits of the case at all. Still, the
inescapable conclusion, based on the Court's
same-day opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, is
that Padilla will soon be charged or freed.
Here's what's happening: Jose Padilla is the
U.S. citizen who supposedly plotted to
detonate a "dirty bomb" and use natural gas
to blow up apartment buildings in New
York, Florida, and Washington, D.C. Since
his capture-not on the battlefields of
Afghanistan or Iraq, but at Chicago's O'Hare
International Airport-he hasn't been
charged with any crime. Yet, since June
2002, Padilla has been held incommunicado
in a South Carolina military brig-
indefinitely, without access to legal help.
[In March 2004, the government did accede
to outside pressure to let his lawyer simply
talk to him.]
In the short term, the Supreme Court's
decision did not change those facts.
Essentially, the Court ducked its opportunity
to decide whether Padilla's detention is
permissible. Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, joined by his four conservative
allies, held that the head of the military brig
in South Carolina, not Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld, was the person whom
Padilla should have sued. Commander
Melanie Marr is Padilla's immediate
custodian, and she is not within the
jurisdiction of the New York federal courts,
where Padilla filed his case. Such niceties
of jurisdiction are necessary, wrote
Rehnquist, to prevent "forum shopping" by
detainees seeking release under the habeas
corpus statute.
The result: Padilla had to start over. He has
now re-filed his petition in South Carolina.
The Case Against Him
So what happens next? Some news reports
indicate that the Justice Department is
planning to indict him. After all, the
government claims that Padilla was detained
because he was an "enemy combatant" who
[1] was "closely associated" with al Qaeda;
[2] had engaged in "war-like acts, including
conduct in preparation for acts of
international terrorism"; [31 had intelligence
that could assist the United States to ward
off future terrorist attacks; and [4] was a
continuing threat to U.S. security. The
government did not allege, however, that
Padilla was actually a member of al Qaeda.
Then, just prior to the Supreme Court's
decision, the Justice Department issued a
report on Padilla's interrogation.
Supposedly. Padilla admitted that he had
attended al Qaeda training camps and
discussed both the detonation of a dirty
bomb and the use of natural gas to blow up
apartment buildings. Bear in mind that
Padilla had no lawyer present, so the
evidence would not be admissible in court.
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The government said that he was not
mistreated, but would not confirm that the
interrogation complied with the Geneva
Conventions. Furthermore, the Justice
Department presented no indictment that
Padilla could challenge.
His appointed lawyer, who met Padilla for
the first time in March, was placed under a
gag order. She could not even say whether
Padilla disputed the allegations. In other
words, no defense was possible. But
according to a footnote in the report, Padilla
denies sworn allegiance to, or being part of,
al Qaeda; denies the bomb plot; and says he
discussed a plot only to avoid fighting in
Afghanistan.
I doubt that the government has a
compelling case, or the Justice Department
would have filed charges long ago. Still,
charges will probably be filed, if only
because the logic of the Hamdi decision
suggests that the government's alternative,
like it or not, is to release Padilla.
Not Like Hamdi
Yaser Esam Hamdi, of course, is another
U.S. citizen, also detained incommunicado
without charges for more than two years.
The major difference between him and
Padilla is that Hamdi was reportedly
apprehended on the battlefield in
Afghanistan, not at O'Hare Airport.
On June 28, the same day as the Padilla
decision, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
released her plurality opinion in Hamdi.
Joined by Justices Rehnquist, Anthony
Kennedy, and Stephen Breyer, she held that
the government "may detain, for the
duration of these hostilities, individuals
legitimately determined to be Taliban
combatants who engaged in armed conflict
against the United States."
Justice Clarence Thomas joined the plurality
with respect to that holding. He actually
filed a dissenting opinion, but his conclusion
tipped even further toward executive power.
He argued that "This detention falls squarely
within the federal government's war powers,
and we lack the expertise and capacity to
second-guess that decision."
Therefore, a majority of the Court clearly
authorized Hamdi's detention. Why then do
I predict Padilla's release if he is not
charged? For four reasons.
First, the implication of the Hamdi plurality
opinion is that the ongoing war on terror
would not justify detention once active
hostilities in Afghanistan end. Arguably,
they have ended.
Second, and more compelling, the Hamdi
plurality said that his detention was
permitted to prevent combatants from
returning to the battlefield. But Padilla did
not come from the battlefield. He was not
one of the "Taliban combatants who
engaged in armed conflict against the United
States."
Third, the Hamdi plurality allowed
executive detention only in light of
Congress' post-9/11 Authorization for Use
of Military Force, which satisfied the
following mandate from a 1971 statute, the
Non-Detention Act: "No citizen shall be
imprisoned or otherwise detained by the
United States except pursuant to an Act of
Congress." According to the Hamdi
plurality, the post-9/11 resolution triggered
the president's commander-in-chief power to
apprehend enemy soldiers in a zone of
active combat.
Perhaps so. But it does not follow that the
president can order the imprisonment,
without charge, of an unarmed civilian far
from active combat, especially a U.S. citizen
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on our own soil. In fact, Justices David
Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a
separate opinion in Hanidi concluding that,
despite the post-9/11 resolution, even
Hamdi's detention violated the Non-
Detention Act. A fortiori, so did Padilla's.
Fourth, considering the Padilla and Hamdi
decisions together, you have to conclude
that if Padilla returns to the Supreme Court,
he'll have five solid votes for release. One
vote would come from Justice Antonin
Scalia. He dissented in Hamdi, joined by
Justice John Paul Stevens, to say that even
Hamdi is entitled to release unless he is
charged with a crime or treason, or unless
Congress suspends habeas corpus.
The remaining four votes for Padilla's
release would come from the four Padilla
dissenters-Justices Stevens, Breyer, Souter,
and Ginsburg-who wanted to reach the
merits of that case. They argued that
"Executive detention of subversive citizens,
like detention of enemy soldiers to keep
them off the battlefield, may sometimes be
justified to prevent persons from launching
or becoming missiles of destruction. It may
not, however, be justified by the naked
interest in using unlawful procedures to
extract information. Incommunicado
detention for months on end is such a
procedure." Padilla's detention, said the
dissenters, was a "form of torture," like the
Star Chamber.
An Unpersuaded Court
Interestingly, spokesmen for the Bush
administration are spinning the Hamdi case
as a victory for executive power. Nothing
could be further from the truth.
Earlier, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
4th Circuit, in an opinion by conservative
Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III, rejected the
government's primary argument: that the
courts cannot second-guess the military's
enemy combatant determinations. Even the
Defense Department has now backed off
that argument. In Rasul v. Bush, the third
war-on-terror case decided by the Supreme
Court on June 28, the government conceded
that habeas corpus jurisdiction would have
existed if any Guantanamo detainee were an
American citizen.
Now, in Hamdi, the Court has rejected the
governments fallback argument: that all the
government has to produce is "some
evidence" to support its enemy combatant
designation. According to the Hamdi
plurality, the detainee gets a lawyer and a
fair opportunity to rebut the government
before a neutral decision-maker. Contrast
that with President George W. Bush's
executive order on military tribunals, which
asserted that a detainee "shall not be
privileged to seek any remedy . . . directly or
indirectly . . . in any court of the United
States."
In its legal briefs, the Defense Department
had insisted that the "combat zone" should
be interpreted broadly, to include even
O'Hare Airport. That idea has seemingly
not resonated with the Court. Al Qaeda may
have brought its crusade to the United
States, but most of the justices, it would
appear, do not regard all of America as a
battlefield in the war on terror. At least the
justices seem unwilling to consider such a
notion as the legal foundation for truncating
Padilla's civil liberties, or the civil liberties
of any other citizens arrested far from the
fighting.
The Case for Law
Finally, administration supporters pose this
hypothetical: Suppose President Bush had
released Padilla, who then proceeded to
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blow up parts of New York. No doubt a
number of the administration's critics would
have sought Bush's impeachment.
Obviously, that dilemma exists whenever
anybody is released for lack of evidence and
then commits a crime. But in the case of
suspected terrorists, the stakes are immense.
So a powerful argument can be made for
changing the rules-tilting toward national
security even though some civil liberties
might be compromised. But if we do
change the rules, the process cannot be
unilaterally implemented by executive edict
without congressional or judicial input. And
it cannot be law on the fly, with no
knowledge of the rules by anyone other than
those executive officials who are responsible
for their enforcement.
Padilla may deserve the treatment he is
receiving-maybe worse. That isn't the
point. When American citizens are taken
into custody, they have, at a bare minimum,
the right to consult an attorney. Then an
impartial court, not the president, should
make the ultimate decision as to whether the
arrest and imprisonment comport with the
Constitution.
In Jose Padilla's case, five justices now say
his ongoing detention is unacceptable.
That's why Padilla must be charged or
released.
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"Judge Rules Terror Suspect Must Be Charged or Freed"
Los Angeles Times
March 1, 2005
Richard A. Serrano
A federal judge on Monday ordered the
Bush administration to either charge or
release an American suspected of plotting
terrorist attacks with Al Qaeda, saying that
his continued confinement after nearly three
years would "only offend the rule of law."
The case of Jose Padilla has drawn unusual
attention because it pits the rights of a U.S.
citizen against the powers of the government
to fight the war on terrorism. The
government contends that by designating
Padilla an "enemy combatant"-not a
criminal defendant-and putting him in
military custody, it can hold him without
charge indefinitely.
He was deemed to be an enemy combatant
by President Bush in June 2002, a month
after his arrest at Chicago's O'Hare
International Airport. Officials accused him
of participating in a plan to detonate a
radioactive "dirty bomb" in the United
States.
Federal prosecutors had hoped to keep the
New York native behind bars in an attempt
to learn all they could about his reported ties
to Al Qaeda and his alleged attempt to scout
targets for attack in the U.S.
But Monday's ruling by U.S. District Judge
Henry F. Floyd found that Padilla's
"indefinite detention without trial" violated
his constitutional right to due process and
ordered the administration to release him or
charge him within 45 days.
"Great decision," said Donna Newman, a
New York lawyer
"The Constitution is
kicking."
representing Padilla.
alive and well and
Government lawyers, who had no immediate
reaction to the order, are likely to appeal the
ruling quickly and forestall any immediate
release of the man they have portrayed as a
grave threat to American security.
The judge noted that prosecutors could
either file criminal charges against Padilla
within 45 days or declare him a "material
witness" to a crime involving other terrorists
and hold him in connection with that case.
Floyd, who was appointed by Bush in 2003,
rejected the government's position that
Padilla was an "enemy combatant" because
he was captured during the ongoing war
against terrorism.
"The president has no power," the judge
said, "neither express nor implied, neither
constitutional nor statutory, to hold [Padilla]
as an enemy combatant."
Eugene R. Fidell, president of the National
Institute of Military Justice, said Monday
that Floyd's ruling was illustrative of what
he called "the revolt of district judges" who
were disturbed by the government's handling
of terror suspects.
"District judges are used to dispensing
justice to people in front of them," Fidell
said. "They are down where the rubber
meets the road in the administration of
justice in this country, and they bring a
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special perspective. And they have found
ways to express their discomfort."
Padilla was arrested in May 2002 at O'Hare
after returning from Pakistan.
Soon afterward, then-Atty. Gen. John
Ashcroft held a news conference during
which he labeled Padilla a dedicated soldier
for Al Qaeda who had betrayed the U.S. to
fight for Osama bin Laden.
Ashcroft said the government had "disrupted
an unfolding terrorist plot to attack the
United States by exploding a radioactive
'dirty bomb.' "
"Al Qaeda officials knew that as a U.S.
citizen holding a valid U.S. passport,
[Padilla] would be able to travel freely in the
United States without drawing attention to
himself," Ashcroft said.
Ashcroft further accused Padilla of returning
to the United States to look for targets for a
plotted chemical attack.
Padilla was held for a short time on a
material witness warrant in connection with
the investigation of the Sept. 11, 2001,
attacks. In June 2002, Bush designated him
an enemy combatant and directed that he be
placed in military custody. Padilla then was
moved to a military base in Charleston, S.C.
Floyd, who presides in Spartanburg, S.C.,
heard Padilla's claim that his constitutional
rights were being violated. Key to his ruling
Monday was the case of another U.S. citizen
who had been held as an enemy combatant.
Yaser Esam Hamdi, born in Louisiana to
Saudi parents, held dual citizenship. He was
detained for several years-first at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, then at Navy brigs
in Norfolk, Va., and Charleston-until his
release last year.
Like Padilla, he was designated an enemy
combatant and held without criminal
charges. But unlike Padilla, Hamdi was
captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan,
fighting for the Taliban and against the
United States.
Hamdi's case made its way last summer to
the U.S. Supreme Court, which ruled that
the government had to charge him with a
crime or release him. The Justice
Department decided that he was no longer of
value to intelligence officials, and he was
allowed to return to Saudi Arabia after
forfeiting his U.S. citizenship and agreeing
to certain travel restrictions.
In Padilla's case, his lawyers argued before
Floyd that the president's inherent
constitutional powers did not allow him to
subject U.S. citizens who were arrested in
the United States to "indefinite military
detention."
They also maintained that Congress never
authorized that kind of indefinite
confinement without trial for U.S. citizens.
Padilla grew up in Chicago, where he was
arrested numerous times as a juvenile for
gang activity. As an adult, he moved to
Florida, married and turned to Islam. He
then left his family and traveled throughout
the Middle East.
The government told the judge that the
president did have "constitutional authority"
to detain Padilla, and cited the Hamdi case
as evidence that the Bush administration was
within its rights to hold Padilla indefinitely.
But the judge determined that "just because
something is sometimes true, [it] does not
mean that it is always true." He then cited
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major inconsistencies between the Hamdi
and Padilla cases.
"The differences between the two are
striking," he said.
He noted that a federal appellate judge
earlier had found that "to compare the
battlefield capture [of] Hamdi to the
domestic arrest [of] Padilla is to compare
apples and oranges."
Padilla, Floyd said, "is an American citizen"
and "was captured in a United States airport.
He is, in some respects, being held for a
crime that he is alleged to have planned to
commit in this country."
The judge said that the "president's use of
force to capture Hamdi" on the Afghan
battlefield "was necessary and appropriate."
But, he said, referring to Padilla's arrest in
Chicago, "that same use of force was not."
Padilla's "alleged terrorist plans were
thwarted at the time of his arrest," Floyd
added. "There were no impediments
whatsoever to the government bringing
charges against him for any one or all of the
array of heinous crimes that he has been
effectively accused of committing."
Using that argument, the judge wrote some
of the sternest language in his order:
"This court is of the firm opinion that it must
reject the position of the [government]. To
do otherwise would not only offend the rule
of law and violate this country's
constitutional tradition, but it would also be
a betrayal of this nation's commitment to the
separation of powers that safeguards our
democratic values and individual liberties."
In the past, the military has stressed that
Padilla needed to be locked up
indefinitely-and kept from defense lawyers
and courtrooms-because intelligence
officers were hoping to break him down in
interrogations and glean information to
prevent future attacks. It is on that basis that
the government is likely to appeal the ruling.
But Newman, Padilla's lawyer, said: "We
will continue to fight for our rights too, and
his."
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"U.S. May Still Charge 'Enemy Combatant,' Gonzales Says"
Los Angeles Times
March 8, 2005
Richard B. Schmitt
Atty. Gen. Alberto R. Gonzales indicated
Monday that the Justice Department might
still file criminal charges against U.S.-born
"enemy combatant" Jose Padilla, even if the
courts ordered his release.
The Justice Department is appealing last
week's decision by a federal judge that the
Bush administration's nearly three-year
detention of Padilla without charges or
regular access to a lawyer violated the law.
Padilla has been in a military brig almost
continuously since his May 2002 arrest by
federal authorities in Chicago in connection
with a suspected plot to launch a radioactive
"dirty bomb" attack on the U.S.
The administration has argued in court that
it has the right to detain Padilla indefinitely
based on the inherent power of the president
as commander in chief. But the court
ordered the government to charge him, name
him as a material witness or release him
within 45 days.
"Certainly, pursuing criminal charges would
be an option that the United States would
have," Gonzales said in a meeting with
reporters. "That decision has not been made
yet."
But whether federal officials can build a
criminal case against Padilla has been in
doubt. The government has obtained a
wealth of information about his activities.
Much of it, however, was obtained from
Padilla when he was in military custody and
did not have access to a lawyer-raising
questions about the admissibility of such
evidence in court.
The department in June aired a detailed
accounting of how Padilla had befriended Al
Qaeda leaders and plotted to blow up high-
rise apartment buildings in the U.S.
The public disclosure of that information,
Justice Department officials said, was done
in part to defuse criticism that Padilla was
being held unjustly.
Justice Department officials at the time said
it would be difficult to bring criminal
charges against Padilla.
"We obviously can't use any of the
statements he's made in military custody,
which will make that option challenging,"
James Comey, the deputy attorney general,
said in making the Padilla report in June.
Gonzales said Monday that another concern
was whether the government could make a
case against Padilla without jeopardizing
"sensitive intelligence collection sources"
that provided information about him. Court
rules normally would give Padilla the right
to challenge his accusers.
Gonzales also said he would continue many
of the policies of his predecessor, John
Ashcroft, including aggressively enforcing
and defending the Patriot Act, passed after
the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.
Portions of the law expire at the end of this
year, and the administration is gearing up for
a fight to renew them. But critics say the
Patriot Act has sometimes been used to
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violate the rights of citizens.
"I want everyone to understand that I think
the Patriot Act has served its purpose in
protecting America in a way that has been
consistent with our values," Gonzales said,
adding that although he favored a debate
about the law, he did not believe it had
caused any abuses.
"I have yet to hear strong arguments as to
why the Patriot Act should not be
reauthorized," Gonzales said. He said critics
of the law had spread "a lot of
misinformation and disinformation" about
its effect.
Gonzales also said he had commissioned an
internal review to study how the department
might further tighten enforcement of federal
obscenity laws-another Ashcroft priority.
He said he had requested a "full briefing and
report" on U.S. government efforts to
address prisoner abuse by U.S. troops or
agents in Cuba and Iraq. The Justice
Department has received a number of
criminal referrals involving allegations of
prisoner mistreatment by CIA operatives.
Gonzales declined to discuss the cases,
noting that they involved continuing
investigations, but said the department
would aggressively pursue allegations of
criminal wrongdoing.
He said that he thought the department could
better use faith-based organizations to
administer Justice Department programs
such as job training and education for
prisoners.
He said that although he embraced an
Ashcroft-era legal opinion broadly defining
the 2nd Amendment right to bear arms, he
did not view the opinion as prohibiting
reasonable gun control efforts, such as
barring former felons from owning firearms.
Gonzales also said that, while working in the
White House, he did not recall being aware
of an alleged assassination plot against
President Bush, mentioned in the indictment
of a former Virginia high school
valedictorian last month.
According to the indictment, Ahmed Omar
Abu Ali planned in 2002 and 2003 to kill
Bush either by shooting him or by
detonating a car bomb.
"I don't know if the president was ever
briefed on this," Gonzales said. "I don't
remember that I was ever briefed."
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"Padilla's Case Returns to Supreme Court"
Legal Times
June 6, 2005
Bethany Broida
Jose Padilla, the U.S. citizen and accused
"dirty bomber" who has been detained as an
enemy combatant for the past three years, is
making another bid for freedom.
Padilla was arrested in May 2002 on a
material witness warrant when he arrived in
the United States from Pakistan via Zurich,
Switzerland. At the time, the government
alleged that Padilla was involved in a plot to
detonate a dirty bomb on U.S. soil. A month
later, President George W. Bush declared
Padilla an enemy combatant and he was
moved to a military brig in South Carolina,
where he remains today.
The president cited Padilla's close
association with al Qaeda as reason for the
designation, saying Padilla "possesses
intelligence" that "would aid U.S. efforts to
prevent attacks by al Qaeda on the United
States" and that he "engaged in hostile and
warlike acts" in preparation for attacks
against America. Padilla, Bush said,
"represents a continuing, present, and grave
danger to the national Security of the United
States."
The alleged al Qaeda loyalist's case already
has wound its way once through the federal
courts, landing before the Supreme Court in
2004. The justices voted 5-4 not to decide
the merits of Padilla's case and instead ruled
that the case had been filed in the wrong
court-it had been filed in New York-and
against the wrong person.
Padilla's lawyers immediately refiled his
case in the U.S. District Court for the
District of South Carolina and named Cmdr.
C.T. Hanft, the commander of the Navy brig
where Padilla is being held, as the
defendant.
In February 2005, the U.S. District Court in
South Carolina agreed with an earlier ruling
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd
Circuit in New York and found that the
government had no grounds to hold Padilla
indefinitely, ruling that he must either be
charged with a crime or released. The
government appealed to the 4th Circuit, the
court that reviews decisions from the South
Carolina federal trial court. The 4th Circuit
agreed to an expedited hearing, but Padilla's
lawyers petitioned the Supreme Court to
take up the case without waiting for the 4th
Circuit to act.
The case,.now called Padilla v. Hanft, is set
for review at the Supreme Court's June 9
conference and asks the justices to consider
whether the president has the power to seize
U.S. citizens on American soil and subject
them to indefinite military detention without
filing formal charges.
"Here we have an American citizen who has
been detained without trial for three years,"
says Jenny Martinez, the counsel of record
for Padilla and an assistant professor at
Stanford Law School. "At some level there
is something fundamentally unfair with the
government saying, 'We can keep you
locked up forever and we can keep changing
[the charges].' "
Martinez, a former clerk to Justice Stephen
Breyer, says she is hopeful the justices will
again grant certiorari, since they are familiar
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with the briefs and the merits of the case
were argued last year.
In its briefs, the government argues that
Padilla's continued detention is lawful under
the resolution passed by Congress shortly
after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks that
allows the president to use "all necessary
and appropriate force" against those "he
determines planned, authorized, committed,
or aided the terrorist attacks."
The government also argues that Supreme
Court involvement at this point would be
premature, since the government's appeal to
the 4th Circuit is still pending.
"It looks more like an effort to avoid the 4th
Circuit," says Richard Samp, chief counsel
for the Washington Legal Foundation, which
filed an amicus brief supporting the
government in the 4th Circuit, but is not
involved in the Supreme Court appeal.
Even if the high court expedited the case,
the justices would not hear arguments until
the fall, Samp says; litigating the case first at
the 4th Circuit would only add a few
months.
But in their brief, Padilla's lawyers-
Michael O'Connell of Stirling & O'Connell
in Charleston, S.C.; New York solos
Andrew Patel and Donna Newman;
Jonathan Freiman of Wiggin and Dana in
New Haven, Conn.; and Martinez-argue
that three years of confinement and
prolonged uncertainty is long enough."[A]ny
benefit that an opinion from the 4th Circuit
might provide is more than outweighed by
the costs of any further delay in the Court's
final adjudication of this issue," they write.
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"Appeal of Detained Terrorism Suspect to Be Heard Today"
Washington Post
July 19, 2005
Jerry Markon
For more than three years, Jose Padilla, an
alleged al Qaeda operative, has been held
without trial, much of the time without
access to a lawyer.
A former Chicago gang member and
Muslim convert, Padilla was arrested at
O'Hare International Airport in May 2002.
A month later, he was designated an "enemy
combatant" by President Bush and sent to a
naval brig in South Carolina.
Today, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th
Circuit will convene in Richmond to
consider a question with vast implications
for civil liberties and the fight against
terrorism: whether in the absence of criminal
charges the president can indefinitely detain
a U.S. citizen captured on U.S. soil.
Federal prosecutors assert that Bush not only
had the authority to order Padilla's detention
but that such power is essential to
preventing attacks.
"In the war against terrorists of global reach,
as the Nation learned all too well on Sept.
11, 2001, the territory of the United States is
part of the battlefield," prosecutors argued in
legal briefs. The government contends that
Padilla trained at al Qaeda camps and was
planning to blow up apartment buildings in
the United States.
Attorneys for Padilla, joined by a host of
civil liberties organizations, say that his
detention is illegal. If not constrained by the
courts, they argue, it could lead to the
military being allowed to hold anyone, from
protesters to people who check out what the
government considers the wrong books from
the library.
"Once you open the door to a power like
that, where does it end?" Andrew Patel, one
of Padilla's attorneys, asked in an interview.
"There is a certain bedrock way we do
things as Americans. If we believe someone
has done something bad, we take them to
court and prove it. It's a grade-school civics
thing."
The debate has featured the unusual
spectacle of former attorney general Janet
Reno, whose Justice Department prosecuted
major terrorism cases during the Clinton
administration, weighing in legally on behalf
of someone the Bush administration calls a
notorious terrorist. She and several other
former Justice officials filed a brief
supporting Padilla's effort to challenge his
detention.
The Bush administration "claims a virtually
unlimited right to ignore Congress's
judgment about what powers are necessary
to protect the country against terrorist
attack," the brief said, arguing that Padilla
could be charged under a variety of laws in
the criminal justice system.
Padilla is one of two U.S. citizens held as
enemy combatants since the terrorist attacks
on the World Trade Center and Pentagon.
The other, Yaser Esam Hamdi, was released
and flown to Saudi Arabia last year after the
Supreme Court upheld the government's
power to detain him but said he could
challenge that detention in U.S. courts.
Hamdi's and Padilla's cases are two among
several recent ones that have raised the most
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significant wartime civil liberties issues
since World War II and that are gradually
clarifying presidential powers to fight the
war on terrorism. But there is a key
difference between the two: Hamdi was
captured on a battlefield in Afghanistan with
forces loyal to that country's former Taliban
rulers, while Padilla was arrested in the
United States.
With the Justice Department seeking to
extend the detention power it won in the
Hamdi case to U.S. citizens captured
domestically, legal experts are closely
watching the appeals court's decision, along
with a likely Supreme Court review after
that.
"I think Padilla is mighty important. This is
the case that really matters most," said
Stephen A. Saltzburg, a law professor at
George Washington University.
The government originally described Padilla
as plotting with al Qaeda to detonate a
radioactive "dirty bomb" but has since
focused on allegations that he planned to
blow up apartment buildings by filling them
with natural gas.
In briefs filed with the 4th Circuit,
prosecutors say Padilla researched building
an atomic bomb but that al Qaeda leaders
thought that the operation was too
complicated. Al Qaeda operations chief
Khalid Sheik Mohammed suggested that
Padilla instead focus on the apartment
building plan, the briefs say.
Padilla "accepted the assignment," the court
papers say, and departed for the United
States with $10,500 in al Qaeda cash, along
with travel documents and a cell phone. His
journey through the U.S. legal system began
when he was arrested by the FBI on a
material witness warrant in connection with
a terrorism investigation in New York.
Bush designated Padilla an enemy
combatant on June 9, 2002, and Padilla's
attorneys challenged his detention in federal
court in New York. In 2003, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit ruled for
Padilla.
The government then appealed to the
Supreme Court, and the court ruled that
Padilla's petition should have been filed in
South Carolina. After Padilla refiled there, a
federal judge this year ordered the
government to charge Padilla with a crime
or release him within 45 days.
"To do otherwise," the judge wrote, "would
not only offend the rule of law and violate
this country's constitutional tradition, but it
would also be a betrayal of this Nation's
commitment to the separation of powers that
safeguards our democratic values and
individual liberties."
The government is now appealing that
decision to the Richmond-based 4th Circuit,
which is generally regarded as the nation's
most conservative appellate court. The 4th
Circuit ruled in the government's favor in
the Hamdi case, saying that the military-
not the courts-had sole authority to wage
war and that courts should defer to
battlefield judgments. The names of the
three 4th Circuit judges who will hear
Padilla's case will not be announced until
today.
Donald G. Rehkopf Jr., co-chairman of the
military law committee of the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers,
which filed a brief on Padilla's behalf, said
the president is seeking "the kind of
executive power that the king of England
had, which is why we had the Revolution in
the first place."
That would mean, he said in an interview,
that "they can arrest you in the middle of the
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night and take you away."
But Richard A. Samp, chief counsel for the
Washington Legal Foundation, a
conservative public-interest law firm that
intervened for the government, said the
enemy combatant designation is needed in
situations where investigators know
someone is a threat but can't make a case in
a traditional criminal court.
If the government loses the argument on
Padilla, Samp said, "I think public safety
would be endangered."
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Defense of Marriage Act
"Judge Calls Defense of Marriage Act Legally Sound"
San Francisco Chronicle
June 17, 2005
Bob Egelko
The federal law that excludes same-sex
couples from the benefits of marriage is
constitutionally sound, a federal judge in
Southern California declared Thursday in a
case that could reach the U.S. Supreme
Court.
Ruling in a suit by two gay men who were
denied a marriage license in Orange County,
U.S. District Judge Gary Taylor said the
1996 federal Defense of Marriage Act
promotes "the stability and legitimacy of
what may reasonably be viewed as the
optimal union for procreating and rearing
children by both biological parents."
Taylor declined the couple's request to rule
on the constitutionality of California's law,
which-like laws in effect in every state
except Massachusetts-allows only
opposite-sex couples to marry. He noted
that a San Francisco judge's ruling in March,
which found that the law violates the rights
of gays and lesbians to marry the partner of
their choice, was based entirely on the
California Constitution. That ruling is on
hold during the state's appeal.
But the significance of Taylor's decision is
that it was only the third in the nation to
address the validity of the Defense of
Marriage Act, and the only one headed for
appeal to higher courts. Rulings in
Washington state and Florida, upholding
other aspects of the law, have not been
appealed.
To some gay-rights advocates' dismay, the
couple's lawyer, Richard Gilbert, said he
will ask the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals in San Francisco to overturn
Taylor's ruling.
"You don't tell a slave that it's not a good
time to bring a case to be freed, to just
remain as a slave until some political action
committee feels it's a good time," Gilbert
said. "You'd never say to a victim of civil
rights abuse that this isn't a convenient time
to address your rights. It's like telling a
person in a burning building that this isn't a
convenient time to exit."
But lawyers who challenged the California
marriage law in the San Francisco case said
it's too early to take the marriage issue to
federal courts and risk an unfavorable ruling
by an appeals court or the U.S. Supreme
Court.
"We wish this case had not gone forward,"
said attorney Shannon Minter of the
National Center for Lesbian Rights, which
represents 12 same-sex couples. The
inability of gays and lesbians to marry
makes it difficult to bring the human impact
of laws like these before the court and
makes it more likely that the federal law will
be upheld, Minter said.
San Francisco City Attorney Dennis
Herrera, who is contesting California's
marriage law in state court, joined Minter's
group in asking Taylor to dismiss the federal
case on the grounds that an unmarried
couple isn't affected by the federal law. The
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judge disagreed, saying registered domestic
partners like the plaintiffs in this case might
qualify for federal marriage benefits if the
federal law didn't exclude them. Chief
Deputy City Attorney Therese Stewart said
the office would probably renew the
argument before the appeals court.
The law, signed by then-President Bill
Clinton, reserved federal benefits-joint tax
filing, Social Security survivors' rights,
immigration status and numerous other
marital privileges-to opposite-sex couples.
Another provision of the law, not involved
in this case, allows states to refuse to
recognize same-sex marriages performed in
another state or nation.
The suit was filed in September by
Christopher Hammer and Arthur Smelt of
Mission Viejo after they were twice denied a
marriage license in Orange County. They
have been a committed couple since 1997.
The argument that prevailed in the state
case-that the marriage restriction violates
the fundamental right to marry the partner of
one's choice-was rejected by Taylor.
Fundamental rights under the U.S.
Constitution are limited to those that are
"deeply rooted in this nation's history and
tradition" for at least a half century, he said,
quoting a Supreme Court ruling, adding that
no such tradition exists for same-sex
marriage.
Congress could have plausibly believed that
allowing only opposite-sex couples to marry
would encourage the best environment for
raising children, Taylor said.
The U.S. Justice Department, which
defended the law, was pleased by Taylor's
ruling, said spokesman Charles Miller. The
decision was also praised by the Alliance
Defense Fund, a conservative organization
that is taking part in the defense of both the
state and the federal marriage laws.
"Defining marriage as one man and one
woman is not only constitutional, it is
common sense," said Byron Babione, a
lawyer for the group.
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"Backing Two-Sex Marriage Is Upheld by Federal Judge"
New York Times
August 19, 2004
Adam Liptak
A 1996 federal law that defines marriage as
"a legal union between one man and one
woman" is constitutional, a federal judge in
Tacoma, Wash., ruled Tuesday. It is the
first decision of a federal court to address
the constitutionality of the law, the Defense
of Marriage Act.
The decision is not binding on other courts,
and the question of the constitutionality of
the marriage law is likely to give rise to
many decisions in coming years.
The Tacoma decision arose from a
bankruptcy filing. Lee and Ann Kandu, two
American women, were married in British
Columbia in August 2003 and filed a joint
bankruptcy petition in Tacoma two months
later. The Justice Department opposed the
joint filing, saying the federal marriage law
forbade it.
The Defense of Marriage Act, signed into
law by President Bill Clinton in 1996, has
two significant provisions. One says that
only married couples made up of a man and
a woman can qualify for rights and benefits
under federal programs that take marital
status into account. A report by the General
Accounting Office in 1997 said more than
1,000 federal laws were affected.
The second significant provision of the
marriage law allows states to decline to
recognize same-sex marriages from other
states. That aspect of the law was not an
issue in Tacoma.
In that decision, Judge Paul B. Snyder of
Federal Bankruptcy Court considered the
interaction of the marriage law and the
bankruptcy code. A bankruptcy law allows
spouses to file joint petitions. But the
marriage law specifies that "the word
'spouse' refers only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife."
Judge Snyder ruled that there was no
fundamental constitutional right to marry
someone of the same sex and that it did not
violate the equal-protection clause of the
Constitution to allow opposite-sex couples
to marry but to prohibit same-sex couples
from doing so.
The government argued that the differing
treatment was justified as "rationally related
to the legitimate government interest in
encouraging the development of
relationships optimal for procreating and
childrearing."
Judge Snyder accepted that rationale, but
reluctantly.
"This court's personal view," he wrote, is
"that children raised by same-sex couples
enjoy benefits possibly different, but equal,
to those raised by opposite-sex couples."
He said he was required to give Congress
great deference in reviewing the marriage
law.
"This court cannot say," Judge Snyder
continued, that the "limitation of marriage to
one man and one woman is not wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of the
government's interest."
Contact information was not available for
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the petitioner in the bankruptcy case, Lee
Kandu, who represented herself without a
lawyer. Ann C. Kandu died in March.
Susan Sommer, a lawyer with Lambda
Legal Defense and Education Fund, said
Judge Snyder should have been more
skeptical.
"The judge applied a sort of rubber-stamp
approach," Ms. Sommer said. "There is a
fundamental right to marry that applies
without exception to all people. You can't
dole out fundamental rights only to some."
This month, a state court judge in Seattle
ruled that same-sex couples were entitled to
marry under the state's Constitution.
Though that case did not involve the federal
marriage law, its reasoning about whether
the state's interest in promoting procreation
can justify a ban on same-sex marriages was
sharply at odds with that of Judge Snyder.
"The precise question," the judge in the
Seattle case, William L. Downing of King
County Superior Court, wrote, "is whether
barring committed same-sex couples from
the benefits of the civil marriage laws
somehow serves the interest of encouraging
procreation. There is no logical way in
which it does so."
Judge Downing stayed his decision pending
review by the Washington Supreme Court.
The sole state in which same-sex couples
can marry is Massachusetts, under decisions
of its Supreme Judicial Court. Yesterday, a
trial judge in Boston upheld a 1913 state law
that prevents marriage licenses from being
issued to couples from outside the state if
their marriages would be illegal where they
live.
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"Supreme Court Paved Way forMarriage
Ruling with Sodomy Law Decision"
New York Times
November 19, 2003
Linda Greenhouse
In its gay rights decision five months ago
striking down a Texas criminal sodomy law,
the Supreme Court said gay people were
entitled to freedom, dignity and "respect for
their private lives." It pointedly did not say
they were entitled to marry.
In fact, both Justice Anthony M. Kennedy,
in his majority opinion for five justices, and
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, in her
separate concurring opinion, took pains to
demonstrate that overturning a law that sent
consenting adults to jail for their private
sexual behavior did not imply recognition of
same-sex marriage, despite Justice Antonin
Scalia's apocalyptic statements to the
contrary in an angry dissent proclaiming that
all was lost in the culture wars.
The Texas case "does not involve whether
the government must give formal
recognition to any relationship that
homosexual persons seek to enter," Justice
Kennedy wrote. And Justice O'Connor
wrote: "Unlike the moral disapproval of
same-sex relations-the asserted state
interest in this case-other reasons exist to
promote the institution of marriage beyond
mere moral disapproval of an excluded
group."
And yet, despite the majority's disclaimers,
it is indisputable that the Supreme Court's
decision in Lawrence v. Texas also struck
much deeper chords. It was a strikingly
inclusive decision that both apologized for
the past and, looking to the future, anchored
the gay-rights claim at issue in the case
firmly in the tradition of human rights at the
broadest level.
And it was this background music that
suffused the decision Tuesday by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court that
same-sex couples have a state constitutional
right to the "protections, benefits, and
obligations of civil marriage." The second
paragraph of Chief Justice Margaret
Marshall's majority opinion included this
quotation from the Lawrence decision: "Our
obligation is to define the liberty of all, not
to mandate our own moral code."
"You'd have to be tone deaf not to get the
message from Lawrence that anything that
invites people to give same-sex couples less
than full respect is constitutionally suspect,"
Professor Laurence H. Tribe of Harvard
Law School said in an interview. Professor
Tribe said that had the Texas case been
decided differently-or not at all-"the odds
that this cautious, basically conservative
state court would have decided the case this
way would have been considerably less."
The Massachusetts decision was based on
the state's Constitution, which Chief Justice
Marshall described as "if anything, more
protective of individual liberty and equality
than the federal Constitution." She said the
Massachusetts Constitution "may demand
broader protection for fundamental rights;
and it is less tolerant of government
intrusion into the protected spheres of
private life."
Clearly, the state ruling, Goodridge v'.
Department of Public Health, was not
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compelled by the Supreme Court's decision
in Lawrence v. Texas and, given its basis in
state law, cannot be appealed to the Supreme
Court. Whether it will influence other state
high courts remains to be seen. A similar
case in the New Jersey state courts was
dismissed this month at the trial level and is
now on appeal.
Yet just as clearly, the Massachusetts
decision and the Lawrence ruling were
linked in spirit even if not as formal
doctrine. The Goodridge decision "is
absolutely consistent with and responsive to
Lawrence," Suzanne Goldberg, a professor
at Rutgers University Law School who
represented the two men who challenged the
Texas sodomy law in the initial stages of the
Lawrence case, said in an interview. Ms.
Goldberg added: "It's impossible to
overestimate how profoundly Lawrence
changed the landscape for gay men and
lesbians."
Professor Goldberg said that sodomy laws,
even if not often enforced, had the effect of
labeling gays as "criminals who deserved
unequal treatment." With that argument
removed, discriminatory laws have little left
to stand on, she said, adding that the
Supreme Court "gave state courts not only
cover but strength to respond to unequal
treatment of lesbians and gay men."
The Massachusetts court considered and
rejected the various rationales the state put
forward to defend opposition to same-sex
marriage. These included providing a
"favorable setting for procreation" and
child-rearing and defending the institution of
marriage.
"It is the exclusive and permanent
commitment of the marriage partners to one
another, not the begetting of children, that is
the sine qua non of civil marriage," Chief
Justice Marshall said. Noting that the
plaintiffs in this case "seek only to be
married, not to undermine the institution of
civil marriage," she said, "The marriage ban
works a deep and scarring hardship on a
very real segment of the community for no
rational reason."
The decision will usher in a new round of
litigation. The federal Defense of Marriage
Act anticipated this development by
providing that no state shall be required to
give effect to another state's recognition of
same-sex marriage.
On the books since 1996, the law has gone
untested in the absence of any state's
endorsement of same-sex marriage. With 37
states having adopted laws or constitutional
provisions defining marriage as between a
man and a woman, same-sex couples with
Massachusetts marriage licenses may soon
find themselves with the next Supreme
Court case in the making.
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"States' Recognition of Same-Sex Unions May Be Tested"
Washington Post
November 19, 2003
Charles Lane
Alarmed by a 1996 Hawaii court case that
raised the prospect of legalized same-sex
marriage, Congress and 37 states enacted
laws designed to keep the phenomenon from
spreading across the country.
It was a kind of legal flood-control system,
built from statutes that defined marriage as
the union of one man and one woman,
designed so that no state would have to
recognize a same-sex marriage from another
state.
Now, because of the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts, Americans are about to
find out whether this containment structure
can stand up under pressure.
If the ruling goes into effect six months from
now as the court envisions, and if same-sex
couples carrying Massachusetts marriage
licenses settle in other states, it probably will
be only a matter of time before someone
goes to court claiming the right to have a
same-sex marriage recognized outside the
Bay State, legal analysts on both sides of the
issue said.
"The floodgates will be tested," said Dale
Carpenter, a law professor at the University
of Minnesota.
It is likely they will hold, at least initially,
legal analysts said. Hawaii's ruling was
never put into practice because the state's
voters adopted a constitutional amendment
permitting a ban on same-sex marriages.
Supreme courts in states where the
legislature has spoken only recently against
same-sex marriage probably would not
strike down those laws.
The U.S. Supreme. Court's landmark
decision in June to overturn state same-sex
sodomy laws, Lawrence v. Texas, celebrated
the dignity of same-sex relationships and
clearly helped inspire yesterday's
Massachusetts decision. But the court said
in Lawrence that it was not expressing a
view on same-sex marriage, and few believe
that the justices are eager to take on the
issue soon.
Still, the impact of the Massachusetts ruling
is not only legal but also emotional and
political. It could ultimately reverberate in
ways that may not be apparent from a
reading of black-letter law as it exists today.
" very much feel this case has a lot of
resonance with what the California Supreme
Court did in 1948 when it became the first to
strike down a ban on interracial marriage,"
said Mary L. Bonauto, the lawyer who
represented the seven same-sex couples who
won in Massachusetts yesterday. "That was
at a time when nine out of 10 Americans
still opposed interracial marriage and no
court had ever ruled in favor of it."
The post-1996 legislation, known in its
federal version as the Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA), reinforced Supreme Court
doctrine, which interprets the U.S.
Constitution to require states to give "full
faith and credit" to one another's court
judgments-but not necessarily to their
legislative or administrative acts. If Kansas
started issuing driver's licenses to 14-year-
olds, for example, police in next-door
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Missouri still could order drivers younger
than 16 off the roads.
"It is settled that states are not required to
recognize every marriage performed in
every other state," Carpenter said. "And
they're not required to do so when they have
a public policy contrary to recognizing that
marriage."
This is why most of the state versions of
DOMA include explicit language declaring
that same-sex marriage is contrary to their
public policy.
Still, it is possible that at least one state,
Vermont, which has a law recognizing civil
unions, would recognize a Massachusetts
marriage, and the same might happen in
California, which recently adopted a
domestic partnership law that gives same-
sex couples marriage-like status.
And in the states that do not have DOMAs
yet, said Matthew Coles, director of the
American Civil Liberties Union's Lesbian
and Gay Rights Project, "courts are likely to
find an absence of public policy."
Another line of attack against the federal
and state DOMA legislation would be to
argue that, by denying those who wish to
form same-sex couples a right that is
enjoyed by opposite-sex couples, they
violate the constitutional guarantee of equal
treatment under the law.
The ACLU is currently pressing such a
claim in a Nebraska federal court, arguing
against the state's constitutional amendment
on marriage, adopted by referendum in
2000, which prohibits the legislature from
adopting any measure that would recognize
same-sex marriage, civil unions or domestic
partnerships.
The ACLU believes it has a strong case
based on a 1996 Supreme Court ruling that
invalidated a Colorado constitutional
amendment. The amendment would have
abolished state anti-discrimination laws
benefiting gay men and lesbians, Coles said.
Still, in most cases, the equal protection
argument would require advocates to
convince courts that opposition to same-sex
marriage is so irrational that no reasonable
legislator could have voted for it, legal
analysts noted. That argument won in
Massachusetts but probably would not in,
say, Alabama.
Mathew D. Staver, president and general
counsel of Liberty Counsel, which opposes
same-sex marriage in courts and legislatures
nationwide, noted that trial and appeals
courts in Arizona, New Jersey and Indiana
have recently dismissed equal-protection
claims in same-sex marriage cases. But
those cases will be appealed.
Still well over the horizon is the question of
what states would do in the case of a same-
sex couple that had married and then
divorced in Massachusetts. If the divorce
court awarded one member of the couple
some of their property in another state,
would he have a right to expect that state's
courts to enforce the judgment?
The answer is probably yes, said William
Eskridge, a law professor at Yale University.
Though the second state would not have to
recognize the marriage license, a divorce
decree-resulting from an adversarial
judicial proceeding-is the kind of action
that the Supreme Court has required the
states to recognize mutually, he said.
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"Bush Has the Wrong Remedy to
Court-Imposed Gay Marriage"
National Journal
March 13, 2004
Stuart Taylor Jr.
"Because of the full faith and credit clause
of the Constitution (which makes every state
accept 'the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State'),
gay marriage can be imposed on the entire
country by a bare majority of the state
supreme court of but one state [. .] The
1996 Defense of Marriage Act? Nonsense.
It pretends to allow the states to reject
marriage licenses issued in other states. But
there is not a chance in hell that the Supreme
Court will uphold it."
So says columnist Charles Krauthammer.
Not so fast, contends my colleague Jonathan
Rauch: "The U.S. Supreme Court is
unlikely to impose one state's gay marriages
on the whole country."
Since columnists disagree, let's go to the
scholars. Professor Lea Brilmayer of Yale
Law School sides with Rauch: "Marriages
have never received the automatic effect
given to judicial decisions. They can be
refused recognition in other states without
offending full faith and credit," she said in
congressional testimony on March 3. But
others agree with professor Larry Kramer of
New York University's law school, who
wrote in 1997, "States cannot selectively
discriminate against each other's laws, [and]
Congress cannot authorize them to do so."
This debate is of more than academic
interest. Much of the energy behind the
Bush-backed proposal to ban gay marriage
by constitutional amendment comes from
fear of nationwide imposition of gay
marriage by a kind of judicial chain reaction.
The same fear gave birth to the federal
Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, known as
DOMA, which authorizes states to ignore
gay marriages performed in other states, and
the "little DOMA" laws in 38 states, which
declare their intent to do just that.
Is this fear of a nationwide, judicially
engineered redefinition of marriage
plausible? Yes, somewhat, although it's
likely to take several years if it happens at
all. Is the proposed constitutional ban on
gay marriage a justifiable response? No,
emphatically. There are ways to get the
courts out of the gay-marriage business
without tying the hands of future voting
majorities who may-and, I hope, will-
eventually come to see gay marriage as good
for us all.
The most direct and sweeping way for the
Supreme Court to impose gay marriage is
also the least likely. That would be to
legalize gay marriage everywhere by
announcing that the 14th Amendment's
equal protection clause (or the due process
clause, or both), which the Court used in
1967 to strike down laws against interracial
marriage, can no longer tolerate the man-
woman definition of marriage that has been
a cornerstone of civilization for the past few
thousand years.
Last June's decision in Lawrence v. Texas,
which used the due process clause to strike
down all state laws making it a crime to
have gay sex, led Justice Antonin Scalia to
suggest in a bitter dissent that the Court had
set the stage to declare a right to gay
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marriage. But there is a big difference
between ruling that gays cannot be branded
criminals and ruling that they must be given
the privileges of marriage. Few serious
analysts expect the justices to take that big a
leap unless and until public opposition to
gay marriage softens to the point that they
could pull it off without provoking a
firestorm.
The stealthier way to promote gay marriage,
and the way that is most feared by
opponents, would be the full-faith-and-credit
two-step: Step one is for the justices to
watch from the sidelines while state courts
in Massachusetts and perhaps elsewhere use
their state constitutions to impose gay
marriage upon their own electorates. Step
two would be for the Court to require that
other states recognize those marriages and,
in the process, to strike down all of the
defense-of-marriage acts.
Brilmayer and some others say the justices
will not take step two. And the traditional
judicial interpretation of the full faith and
credit clause is on their side. While the
norm has always been for states to recognize
marriages celebrated in other states, "the full
faith and credit clause has never been
understood to require recognition of
marriages entered into in other states that are
contrary to local 'public policy'
[representing] deeply held local values," as
Brilmayer testified. Under this "public
policy" doctrine, states have been free to
disregard marriages in other states between
first cousins, people too young to marry in
their home states, people who remarried
after quickie Nevada divorces, and (before
1967) people of different races.
But Brilmayer's views are disputed by
dozens of law review articles arguing that
DOMA, the 38 state DOMAs, and (many
add) even the long-standing "public policy"
doctrine, are all unconstitutional, at least in
the gay-marriage context. Gay-advocacy
groups have prepared a well-orchestrated
litigation campaign to use the full faith and
credit clause to force recognition of gay
marriages across the country. And Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy has provided them
with powerful ammunition with his majority
opinions in both Lawrence and the 1996
decision in Romer v. Evans, which used the
equal protection clause to strike down a
Colorado referendum barring adoption of
gay-rights laws anywhere in the state. Both
decisions held that animus against
homosexuals-which Scalia called "moral
disapprobation"-is an irrational and
illegitimate basis for some, if not necessarily
all, anti-gay laws. It would not be a great
leap to extend this logic to strike down
DOMA and its state-law clones, and then to
carve a gay-marriage exception into the
public policy doctrine.
"The prophecies of what the courts will do
in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are
what I mean by the law," Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes Jr. once said. In that spirit,
I prophesy that Kennedy, his four more-
liberal colleagues, and possibly Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, will seek to promote
gay marriage but will proceed cautiously,
with their fingers to the winds of public
opinion. They may begin. by issuing
narrowly drawn decisions enforcing state
court judgments-which other states have
almost always been required to honor - such
as judicially approved property settlements
in divorce decrees growing out of
Massachusetts gay marriages. And when
these justices sense that the time is ripe-
assuming that those who remain on the
Court have the votes-they will apply the
full-faith-and-credit two-step to ban states
from discriminating against other states' gay
marriages in any way.
This prospect leaves me quite conflicted.
While I strongly support gay marriage, I
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oppose its imposition by judicial fiat. And
while judicial activism at its best can build
public consensus for long-overdue reforms, I
am concerned that the courts have
increasingly crossed the line from exercising
healthy activism into usurping legislative
powers., disdaining representative
government, and casually casting aside
tradition in the guise of interpreting the
Constitution.
So I have some sympathy for the idea of
amending the Constitution to prohibit any
judicial decision construing that document
to require recognition of any gay marriage.
(The problem of state courts in
Massachusetts and elsewhere inventing state
constitutional rights can and should be
handled at the state level.) Because
amending the Constitution is a grave step
that risks unintended consequences, I am not
yet ready to support that approach, as long
as the Supreme Court proceeds cautiously
and incrementally on gay marriage. But a
sudden, broad decision requiring all other
states to honor Massachusetts' gay
marriages, for example, might persuade me
that the time has come to reclaim some of
the rights of the people to govern
themselves.
By no stretch of the imagination, however,
is the proposed amendment behind which
Bush has placed his prestige an appropriate
way to protect representative government.
Quite the contrary. The first clause of the
so-called Musgrave amendment (sponsored
by Rep. Marilyn Musgrave, R-Colo.) would
impose a uniform federal definition of
marriage upon the whole country:
"Marriage in the United States shall consist
only of the union of a man and a woman."
This amounts to an anti-democratic, anti-
federalist effort to ban all state legislatures,
for all time, from experimenting with gay
marriage-even if and when most voters in
most states come to support gays' right to
wed. And public opinion appears to be
headed in that direction: Although polls still
show voters opposing gay marriage by a
ratio of about 2-to-1, the numbers appear to
be softening over time. Especially
significant is that young voters are far more
open to gay marriage than old ones.
In this sense, the president's position on gay
marriage has something in common with
that of the Massachusetts court: Neither is
willing to defer to democratic governance.
While the court has imposed its definition of
marriage on today's voters, Bush seeks to
impose his own definition on their children
and grandchildren.
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"Vote on Defense of Marriage Act Provision
Treads Tricky Legal Ground in Limiting Courts' Jurisdiction"
CQ Weekly
July 24, 2004
Seth Stern
One week after the Senate rejected a
proposal to take up a constitutional
amendment barring same-sex marriages, the
House passed a different measure designed
to limit gay and lesbian unions.
The House on July 22 bolstered a 1996 law
defining marriage as a heterosexual union by
passing legislation designed to bar federal
courts from hearing challenges to a
provision in the statute, known as the
Defense of Marriage Act (PL 104-199). The
bill (HR 3313) passed 233-194, though it
stands little chance of passage in the Senate.
(House Vote 410, p. 1832)
House Republicans defended the bill as an
urgent necessity, particularly after the
Senate refused to limit debate and vote on a
motion to take up the proposed
constitutional amendment to bar same-sex
marriage (S J Res 40, H J Res 56). GOP
lawmakers said the House bill would ensure
that states remain the final arbiter over laws
concerning marriage.
But Democrats decried the measure as a
back-door attempt to amend the
Constitution. They also said the bill would
undermine the federal judiciary by stripping
courts' ability to rule on the 1996 law's
constitutionality.
"This is about whether the third branch of
government, the judiciary . . . will continue
to be the arbiter of what is constitutional in
the American system," said John Conyers,
Jr. of Michigan, the ranking Democrat on
the House Judiciary Committee.
Conservatives fear that the 1996 statute
could be undermined by the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court's ruling in
November that held same-sex marriage legal
under that state's constitution. On July 20, a
lesbian couple married in Massachusetts
filed suit in U.S. District Court in Tampa
after Florida did not recognize their
marriage license.
"This is an issue thrust upon us by rogue
mayors and rogue courts," said Republican
Steve Chabot of Ohio.
The bill, sponsored by John Hostettler, R-
Ind., would prevent all federal courts,
including the Supreme Court, from having
jurisdiction over a provision in the 1996 law
that gave states the option of not recognizing
same-sex marriages performed in other
states. The law also defined marriage as the
union of a man and a woman.
"This legislation ensures the people and the
states will have a say in marriage policy,"
said House Judiciary Committee Chairman
F. James Sensenbrenner Jr., R-Wis.
Constitutional Law Basics
Under the bill, each state court would
determine the constitutionality of the federal
1996 law. Republicans argued it would
ensure same-sex couples have access to
judicial review. However, opponents said it
is a recipe for chaos because states could
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wind up interpreting the U.S. Constitution in
conflicting ways.
The bill attracted the support of 27
Democrats; 17 Republicans voted against it.
Among the opponents of the legislation is
former Rep. Bob Barr, R-Ga. (1995-2003),
chief sponsor of the 1996 law, who said the
bill would set a "dangerous precedent for
future Congresses" that could find it
tempting to insert similar language in other
bills.
The debate on the House floor had the flavor
of a constitutional law school class, as each
side lectured the other on historical
precedents.
Bill supporters say Article III of the
Constitution gives Congress authority to
regulate federal court jurisdiction. They cite
a series of recently enacted laws that limit
judicial review on issues ranging from the
construction of the World War II memorial
to fighting forest fires.
"If limiting federal court jurisdiction is good
enough to protect trees, it sure ought to be
good enough to protect state marriage
policies," Sensenbrenner said. In recent
decades, Republicans have unsuccessfully
pushed similar proposals to limit federal
court jurisdiction over abortion, recitation of
the Pledge of Allegiance and school prayer.
But Democratic opponents contend that such
measures amount to unprecedented attempts
at "court stripping" that would undermine
the separation of powers. Congress has
rarely, if ever, passed laws that would bar all
federal courts from reviewing the
constitutionality of a statute, according to
many constitutional scholars. And with so
few precedents, the constitutionality of such
a measure remains an open question, the
Congressional Research Service concluded,
Opponents-including the American Civil
Liberties Union-say this specific bill also
would be an infringement on gay and
lesbian couples' right to equal protection
under the Constitution.
Regardless of the measure's fate, the House
is expected to take up the issue of gay
marriage again after the summer recess
when it debates the proposed same-sex
marriage constitutional amendment.
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Partial Birth Abortion
"'Partial-Birth' Abortion Case Advances"
SCOTUSblog
July 8, 2005
Lyle Denniston
Moving the heated controversy over a ban
on so-called "partial-birth" abortion closer
to the Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit on
Friday ruled that Congress acted
unconstitutionally in 2003 in outlawing such
abortions nationwide. This was the first of
three expected decisions by Circuit Courts
on an issue that almost certainly will go to
the Supreme Court to be decided finally.
The Eighth Circuit ruled in LeRoy Carhart,
et al., v. Gonzales (docket 04-3379).
Similar test cases are pending in the Second
and Ninth Circuits.
The three-judge panel disposed of the case
in a fairly complex yet still compact 21-page
ruling-a judicial effort far less strenuous
than the 444-page decision by U.S. District
Judge Richard G. Kopf of Lincoln, Neb.,
striking down the law last September 8. The
Circuit Court upheld one of Judge Kopf's
conclusions: that the federal "Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act" was invalid because it
lacked an exception to the ban that would
permit the procedure when necessary to
protect a pregnant woman's health.
A significant feature of the Circuit Court's
decision was that it nullified the federal law
without second-guessing the factual
conclusions in which Congress had declared
that there would never be a "medical
necessity" for use of the "partial-birth"
abortion method. The court declared: "We
need not address the government's
assertions that federal courts must defer to
congressional fact-finding." The approach it
took thus put aside the primary argument the
Justice Department had made in defending
the law-that is, Congress' finding of a total
lack of medical necessity was entitled to
deference by the courts.
After the Supreme Court had ruled in 2000
that a Nebraska state law banning the
procedure was invalid in part because it
lacked a health exception (Stenberg v.
Carhart), Congress sought to get around that
decision by passing a federal law,
concluding as a fact that the particular
procedure was never medically necessary.
Like the case decided by the Justices in
2000, the new Eighth Circuit case came
from Nebraska and, indeed, the lead
challenger in the case to the federal law-
Dr. LeRoy Carhart-is the same doctor who
won the Supreme Court case against the
state law five years ago.
It is possible that the new decision could
make the Nebraska case the first to reach the
Supreme Court as a sequel testing anew the
power of legislatures, national and state, to
ban the abortions at issue. Another
significant test case, involving a state ban
enacted in Virginia, has been struck down
by a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit, but
that court has shown an interest in a motion
for rehearing en banc-an issue that won't
be fully briefed until later this month. (That
case is Richmond Medical Center for
Women, et al., v. Hicks, et al., docket 03-
1821.)
In the Nebraska case involving the federal
ban, the Circuit Court said that the Justice
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Department had made its plea for deference
to Congress upon "an erroneous
assumption"-that is, that the key question
in the case was a factual question about the
medical necessity of the procedure. The
ultimate factual conclusion the lawmakers
made on that point, the court said, "is
irrelevant."
The "precise question that must be
answered," it added, is "whether substantial
medical authority supports the medical
necessity of the banned procedure." That, it
said, cannot be answered by looking at what
Congress thought was a purely factual
determination about a consensus in the
medical community. Rather, it said, the
question is "whether there is a certain
quantum of evidence" to support the legal
conclusion that there is a medical need for
the method. That approach is called for, it
said, in order to "achieve constitutional
uniformity" across the nation, instead of
leaving it to individual judges to determine
case by case whether there is a factual need
for the procedure.
The Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit
ultimately concluded, already had settled
that core issue in its 2000 decision in the
Stenberg case. The highest court, the
Circuit judges concluded, had determined
that "substantial medical authority supported
the need for a health exception" to a ban on
partial-birth abortions. "The government,"
it said, "has not adduced evidence
distinguishing this case from Stenberg."
The Supreme Court, it said, had drawn a
legal-a constitutional-conclusion that will
stand unless and until medical technology
and medical knowledge advance to the point
that the particular procedure became
obsolete. "Should that day come,
legislatures might then be able to rely on this
new evidence to prohibit partial-birth
abortions without providing a health
exception," it commented. (The Supreme
Court, of course, could change its mind
about its constitutional conclusion if it takes
up the issue again, but the Circuit Court was
bound by the 2000 decision.)
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"The Next Abortion Case?"
SCOTUSblog
June 3, 2005
Lyle Denniston
A decision by the Fourth Circuit on Friday
may set the stage for the next test in the
Supreme Court of the constitutionality of
laws that ban so-called "partial birth"
abortions. By a 2-1 vote, the Circuit Court
nullified Virginia's 2003 law seeking to
outlaw that form of medical practice for
terminating pregnancy. A strongly worded
dissent by a conservative member of the
Fourth Circuit panel, Circuit Judge Paul V.
Niemeyer, could embolden Virginia state
officials to take the case on to the Supreme
Court-very likely reaching it ahead of
other "partial birth" cases, now awaiting
rulings in three federal circuit courts, that
test the federal ban on such abortions.
The main point of dispute between the
majority ruling, written by Circuit Judge M.
Blane Michael, and Judge Niemeyer's
dissent is the conclusion of the court that the
Supreme Court has laid down a "per se"
constitutional rule that an attempt to ban the
"partial-birth" abortion method must always
contain an exception to protect the health of
the pregnant woman when her doctor
decides the method is medically necessary
for her. That is the interpretation Judge
Michael (joined by Circuit Judge Diana
Gribbon Motz) gives to the Supreme Court's
2000 decision in Stenberg v. Carhart,
striking down Nebraska's "partial birth"
abortion law.
Virginia had argued, unsuccessfully as it
turned out, that the Virginia law was
sufficiently different from the Nebraska ban
that its statute's lack of a health exception
should not doom it. Virginia also had
argued that the challengers to the Virginia
law had not put on sufficient medical
evidence to show that a health exception
was necessary in the "partial-birth" context.
The majority rejected both arguments. It
was not necessary to prove, with evidence,
that some women would have a medical
need for a "partial-birth" procedure, the
court said, because "Carhart established the
health exception requirement as a per se
constitutional rule." Judge Niemeyer
protested that the ruling created "a bold, new
law." Nothing in the Carhart decision, he
argued, "indicates that the Court was
creating a per se constitutional rule."
Another significant facet of the majority
ruling was that it made clear, for the first
time, that the Fourth Circuit does not apply
in the abortion context the normal rule for
judging facial challenges to statutes. The
so-called "Salerno" rule says that a facial
challenge may succeed only if there is proof
that in no set of circumstances can a law be
applied constitutionally. There is a split in
the circuits on whether the Salerno approach
does govern in cases involving facial
challenges to abortion laws, and some
analysts had counted the Fourth Circuit
among the minority of courts applying
Salerno to such cases. Friday's ruling
concludes just the opposite. (This is an
issue the Supreme Court itself will be
confronting in its next Term, because the
Justices on May 23 agreed to hear it in the
New Hampshire abortion case, Ayotte v.
Planned Parenthood of Northern New
England [04-1144]. That case, however,
involves a parental notice abortion law, not a
"partial-birth" statute.)
Three U.S. District Courts have struck down
the federal ban on the "partial-birth"
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method, and all three cases have been
appealed by the Justice Department to
circuit courts. None, however, has yet ruled
on the federal statute. (The three circuits are
the 2d, 8th and 9th.)
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"Federal Ban on Partial Birth Abortion: Court Rules That
Governments Can't Outlaw Type of Abortion"
New York Times
June 29, 2000
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court ruled by a 5-to-4 vote
today that the government cannot prohibit
doctors from performing a procedure that
opponents call partial-birth abortion because
it may be the most medically appropriate
way of terminating some pregnancies.
The decision declared unconstitutional the
Nebraska law before the court and, in effect,
the laws of 30 other states. In addition, the
bill to create a federal ban on the procedure,
which President Clinton has vetoed twice
and which may reach his desk again this
year, would also be unconstitutional under
the court's analysis: like all the other laws,
it does not contain an exception for the
health of the pregnant woman.
The decision, with a majority opinion by
Justice Stephen G. Brcyer, was analytically
broader than many people expected, finding
fault not only with the law's concededly
imprecise language, but with the absence of
an exception for women's health. At the
same time, the 5-to-4 vote was unexpectedly
close for a court where support for the
underlying right to abortion has been
counted as 6 to 3.
The combination of the broad ruling and the
close vote led Janet Benshoof, president of
the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy,
which represented the Nebraska doctor who
challenged the law, to describe the day as
one for "Champagne and shivers." The
immediate reaction from politicians and
advocates on both sides of the abortion
debate made it likely that the court's future
composition would be the subject of greater
than usual focus during the remainder of this
election year,
The decision, one of four today that totaled
391 pages, came on the final day of the
court's term.
"Partial-birth abortion" is the term
opponents of abortion use to describe a
method that doctors use infrequently to
terminate pregnancies after about 16 weeks.
Anti-abortion forces coined the term in the
mid-1990's and have focused on graphic
descriptions of the procedure as a way of
undermining public support for abortion.
The ruling today represents a significant
setback to that strategy.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy's dissenting
opinion was a major surprise to both sides of
the abortion debate. Not only his
disagreement with the majority, but also the
terms in which he expressed his views both
in this case and in a second abortion-related
decision today indicated Justice Kennedy's
deep unease with a 1992 decision, of which
he was a joint author, that had reaffirmed the
right to abortion. The second decision
upheld restrictions on demonstrations
outside abortion clinics.
Emphasizing what he described as the
-consequential moral difference" between
the "partial-birth" method and other abortion
procedures, Justice Kennedy said that in its
1997 law, Nebraska "chose to forbid a
procedure many decent and civilized people
find so abhorrent as to be among the most
serious of crimes against human life."
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Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg in an opinion
concurring with the majority, said it was
"simply irrational" to find a fundamental
difference in one procedure over another.
Justice Stevens said it was "impossible for
me to understand how a state has any
legitimate interest in requiring a doctor to
follow any procedure other than the one that
he or she reasonably believes will best
protect the woman" in exercising the
constitutional right to obtain an abortion.
Eight of the nine justices-all but David H.
Souter, who joined Justice Breyer's majority
opinion-wrote opinions in the case,
Stenberg v. Carhart, No. 99-830. In
addition to Justices Souter, Stevens and
Ginsburg, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
joined the majority opinion. In addition to
Justice Kennedy, Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and
Clarence Thomas wrote dissenting opinions.
In striking down the Nebraska law, the
majority went further than the federal
appeals court whose decision the court
upheld today. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in St. Louis,
had found Nebraska's law unconstitutional
because, while it was ostensibly aimed only
at a particular type of late-term abortion, its
vague wording would chill doctors in
performing a common second-trimester
abortion procedure that undoubtedly had
constitutional protection under the Supreme
Court's precedents.
The Supreme Court agreed with that
analysis but went on to rule that even a more
precisely worded statute that avoided that
problem would still be unconstitutional in
the absence of a health exception.
Surveying medical opinion on the subject,
Justice Breyer said there was a "substantial
likelihood" that the method at issue was "a
safer abortion method in certain
circumstances." He added, "If so, then the
absence of a health exception will place
women at an unnecessary risk of tragic
health consequences."
Justice Breyer called the ruling "a
straightforward application" of the court's
1992 ruling in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, which reaffirmed the 1973 ruling in
Roe v. Wade. But the dissenters disagreed
and said the decision went further in the
direction of protecting an unqualified right
to abortion. Justice Kennedy, an author of
the Casey decision, said the ruling today was
based on a "misunderstanding" of that
decision and "contradicts Casey's assurance
that the state's constitutional position in the
realm of promoting respect for life is more
than marginal."
James Bopp, general counsel of the National
Right to Life Committee, which drafted the
model law on which the Nebraska statute
and many of the others were based, called
the decision a "radical expansion of the right
to abortion."
Under the Nebraska law, a doctor who
performed a "partial-birth abortion" that was
not necessary to save a woman's life faced a
sentence of up to 20 years in prison. The
law was successfully challenged in Federal
District Court in Omaha by Dr. Leroy
Carhart and has never taken effect. Dr.
Carhart and his wife, Mary, were in the
courtroom today.
The statute defined the procedure as "an
abortion procedure in which the person
performing the abortion partially delivers
vaginally a living unborn child before killing
the unborn child and completing the
delivery." That was defined further to mean
"deliberately and intentionally delivering
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into the vagina a living unborn child, or a
substantial portion thereof' before
terminating the pregnancy.
Nebraska's attorney general, Don Stenberg,
argued that the state Legislature meant to
ban one specific procedure, known in the
medical profession as dilation and
extraction, or D & X. In that procedure,
used beginning in about 16 weeks of
pregnancy when the fetus's head has grown
too big to pass safely through an undilated
cervix, doctors seeking to keep the fetus as
intact as possible for various reasons extract
it feet first and then use a sharp instrument
to collapse the fetal skull.
But the lower courts found, and the majority
today agreed, that the statutory definition of
what Nebraska was prohibiting also applied
to a procedure known as dilation and
evacuation, or D & E, which is used much
more commonly for abortions after the first
trimester of pregnancy. In this procedure,
the fetus is dismembered during the
abortion, meaning that a "substantial
portion" of it may be pulled into the vagina
while the fetus is still alive.
In his opinion, Justice Breyer said the court
had to review the statute as it was written,
and did not have authority to accept the
attorney general's invitation to make it
narrower. Consequently, Justice Breyer
said, all doctors using the D & E method
"must fear prosecution, conviction and
imprisonment," making the law an "undue
burden upon a woman's right to make an
abortion decision."
To that extent, the decision tracked the
ruling last year by the Eighth Circuit.
Where the majority today went further was
in its insistence that even a more precisely
written law needed to have an exception to
protect women's health, in addition to the
provision to save the life of the mother,
which Nebraska's law and the other states'
laws have.
Further, Justice Breyer made it clear that the
health exception had to go beyond
"situations where the pregnancy itself
creates a threat to health." He said that
although the medical testimony was
somewhat equivocal, the court accepted the
view that "a statute that altogether forbids D
& X creates a significant health risk" and
would be unconstitutional for that reason
alone.
In the second abortion decision today, the
court ruled 6-to-3 that a Colorado law aimed
at protecting abortion clinic patients and
doctors from harassment by protesters did
not violate the protesters' First Amendment
rights. The decision, Hill v. Colorado, No.
98-1856, upheld a ruling by the Colorado
Supreme Court. Within 100 feet of the
entrance to any health care facility, no one
may make an unwanted approach within
eight feet of another to talk or pass out a
leaflet.
Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg and
Breyer. Justices Scalia, Thomas and
Kennedy dissented. Justice Scalia and
Justice Kennedy read their impassioned
dissenting opinions in the courtroom this
morning for more than half an hour, making
clear that this First Amendment debate was
in many respects a proxy for the court's
ongoing abortion debate.
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"Senate Passes Ban on Abortion Procedure"
Washington Post
October 22, 2003
Helen Dewar
In a major victory for anti-abortion forces
after an eight-year struggle, Congress
yesterday gave final approval to legislation
banning a particularly controversial
procedure for ending pregnancies, ensuring
a legal showdown that could help define the
scope-and limits-of abortion rights in the
United States.
Voting 64 to 34, the Senate joined the House
in passing the measure to prohibit what
abortion foes call a "partial-birth" procedure
and to punish doctors who violate the ban
with fines and as many as two years in
prison.
The bill, which the House approved 281 to
142 earlier this month, now goes to
President Bush, who has indicated that he is
eager to sign it into law. But opponents plan
to challenge the measure in court and to seek
an injunction to bar its enforcement, relying
in part on the legislation's failure to allow
such an abortion to protect a woman's
health, as required by earlier court decisions.
As described in the bill, the procedure,
generally performed during a pregnancy's
second or third trimester, involves a
physician puncturing the skull of a fetus and
removing its brain after it is partially
delivered.
Sen. Sam Brownback (R-Kan.), a leader in
the fight for the bill, said after the vote:
"This is an enormous day" for the country.
But Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.), an
opposition leader, called it "a very sad day
for the women of America."
Bush said in a statement: "This is very
important legislation that will end an
abhorrent practice and continue to build a
culture of life in America."
In the 30 years since the Supreme Court's
Roe v. Wade decision, which established a
woman's constitutional right to have an
abortion, Congress has never banned a
specific procedure, although it has
repeatedly restricted federal funding for
abortions, including barring payments to
Medicaid patients.
Sponsors said the legislation was designed
to end an especially brutal procedure that
Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.) described as "a
stain on the conscience of America."
But foes of the measure said its language is
broad enough to cast legal doubt over other,
more common abortion procedures. They
said the bill is "step one," as Sen. Tom
Harkin (D-lowa) put it, toward the eventual
destruction of abortion rights in this country.
In part because of such disagreements, there
are no reliable figures on how many
abortions might be banned under the new
law. Critics of the procedure say thousands
of such abortions are performed annually; its
defenders say they are relatively rare.
As they did in earlier debates, the bill's
sponsors surrounded themselves with large,
made-for-television sketches of fetuses.
Supporters focused on the procedure, while
opponents emphasized the broader issue of
abortion rights.
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"We cannot allow this kind of brutality to
corrupt us," said Sen. Rick Santorum (R-
Pa.), who led the fight for the bill.
"Women's right to choose is in greater
danger now than it has been at any time
since the Supreme Court issued the Roe v.
Wade decision 30 years ago," said Sen.
Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.).
In yesterday's vote, 17 Democrats joined 47
Republicans in backing the legislation, while
30 Democrats, three Republicans and one
independent voted against it. Virginia's
senators voted for it; Maryland's senators
opposed it.
The first "partial-birth" abortion bill was
introduced in 1995, after Republicans won
control of both houses of Congress. It was
passed twice in the late 1990s but was
vetoed by President Bill Clinton.
Another effort stalled in 2000 after the
Supreme Court, in a 5 to 4 decision, struck
down a Nebraska statute that was similar in
most respects to the bill that Congress was
considering. The court found the Nebraska
law insufficiently specific in defining the
procedure to be banned and flawed because
it did not include an exception for protecting
a woman's health. The bill got another
chance this year after Republicans regained
the Senate majority, putting them in control
of both houses and the White House.
The key legal question is whether the
current bill's drafters have changed the
measure enough to pass muster with the
Supreme Court.
Backers of the legislation say they defined
the procedure with all the specificity that the
court might require and addressed the health
issue by asserting in a series of findings that
such an abortion is never needed for health
reasons.
But critics said the bill fell short on the
grounds of both specificity and health. They
predicted that the Supreme Court will strike
it down.
Three separate lawsuits against the measure
are planned by the Planned Parenthood
Federation of America, the Center for
Reproductive Rights and the National
Abortion Federation. The latter will be
represented by the American Civil Liberties
Union.
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"Next on Abortion: Supreme Collision"
Washington Post
November 23, 2003
Simon Lazarus
Abortion opponents won a major victory
recently by pushing a "partial-birth"
abortion ban through Congress, but that
victory could turn sour when the case
reaches the Supreme Court.
Why? First, because a 5-4 court struck
down a similar Nebraska law three years
ago. But there's another, far more
consequential reason: Over the past
decade, a different majority-led by
conservatives Chief Justice William
Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia
and Clarence Thomas-has struck down
other federal laws that attempted to
regulate activities traditionally left to the
states. This majority has also held
Congress to a strict interpretation when it
used constitutional language such as the
Interstate Commerce Clause to claim
federal jurisdiction, which is exactly
what Congress did in enacting the
abortion ban. Ironically, these are the
same three justices who have reliably
supported abortion opponents in
defending state anti-abortion laws. And
now the court will have to choose.
In keeping with its pattern of decisions
that enhance states' rights and curtail
federal power in the name of
"federalism," the court may well decide
that Congress lacks the authority to pass
any law banning or regulating abortions.
That result would not only extinguish the
new law, it would decimate much of the
rest of the "pro-life" agenda, in particular
the wish to secure nationwide bans on
such practices as euthanasia, cloning and
stem-cell research. So the question is:
Will Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas keep
their federalism faith, even if that
requires betraying political allies on the
religious right?
Their quandary does not revolve around an
abstract philosophical tension between
states' rights and big government, but rather
around a specific matter of law. Congress
justified the new abortion law on the basis of
the commerce clause, the constitutional
provision that authorizes it to "regulate
commerce among the states." The law
imposes criminal sanctions on practitioners
who, "in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce," perform the banned procedure.
Until recently, this drafting technique might
have raised no eyebrows. Beginning in the
New Deal era, Congress reflexively invoked
the commerce clause as a catch-all to
legitimize laws which, like the new abortion
ban, address activity that is neither
"interstate" nor "commerce." The Supreme
Court went along, never once overturning a
federal statute on the grounds that it
exceeded Congress's commerce clause
power.
But in 1995, in a case known as United
States v. Lopez, the court canceled its blank
check to Congress. With great rhetorical
fanfare, a 5-4 court majority led by
Rehnquist struck down the 1990 Gun Free
School Zones Act, which made it a federal
crime to possess a firearm within 1,000 feet
of a school, as outside the bounds of the
commerce clause. And in 2000, in United
States v. Morrison, the same majority, using
the same grounds, invalidated the 1994
Violence Against Women Act, which
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authorized federal civil lawsuits to redress
gender-based violence against women.
Rehnquist prescribed two new rules in his
landmark opinions: First, that Congress
cannot regulate activities merely because
they "affect" interstate commerce, but only
if they "substantially affect" it; second, if an
activity is not commercial or economic in
nature, its effects on interstate commerce
will not be considered "substantial" merely
because, if repeated many times over, the
aggregate effect might arguably be
substantial. In Morrison, Rehnquist made
clear that he and his allies meant business,
brusquely dismissing voluminous
congressional findings that the aggregate
impact of gender-motivated violence
damaged the national economy. "Simply
because Congress may conclude that a
particular activity substantially affects
interstate commerce does not necessarily
make it so," he wrote.
If Rehnquist and his four colleagues
(Justices Anthony Kennedy and Sandra Day
O'Connor often join Thomas and Scalia to
form this majority) take to heart what the
chief justice wrote in Lopez and Morrison,
they wvill have two options when the latest
abortion law reaches them. They can take
the high ground and strike the law down on
the basis that it addresses activity which, in
line with the spirit as well as the letter of
those cases, "the states may regulate and
Congress may not," Or in deference to
Congress, they can construe the statute
narrowly to avoid (technically) invalidating
it altogether, by strictly limiting its scope to
activities that actually occur in interstate
commerce. In that event, as veteran
Supreme Court litigator Alan Morrison has
observed, the long and bitter struggle for this
law could end up barring late-term abortions
on interstate flights, train trips and
highways, but not much else.
The three most ardent champions of states'
rights-Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas-are
passionate critics of Supreme Court
decisions that invalidated state anti-abortion
laws. If they join the majority from the
Nebraska case and reject the new federal
law, the movement that calls itself "pro-life"
will be hard-pressed to blame rejection of
abortion bans on an arrogant band of liberal
ideologues. More importantly, however, the
movement's other major targets-
euthanasia, cloning and stem-cell research-
are inherently no more "in or affecting
interstate commerce" than is abortion.
Except to the extent that such practices can
be curbed by cut-offs of federal funding,
they, too, could be beyond Congress's grasp.
Of course, the conservative justices could
suspend their distaste for untethered federal
power, which they displayed not only by
striking down the Gun Free School Zones
law and the Violence Against Women Act,
but by limiting other social legislation as
well, such as the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act and the Americans with
Disabilities Act. They could recycle any
number of once-commonly used artifices,
such as positing that late-term abortions are
performed with instruments previously
circulated in interstate commerce. But if
they strain to distinguish recent precedents
in order to save legislative artifacts of the
religious right, they will sorely wound their
federalism crusade, validating liberal
charges that it is a selectively applied sham.
Logically, abortion rights advocates should
jump at the chance to confront their judicial
adversaries with so painful a dilemma. Why
have they not done so? Perhaps because
they and their political allies abhor the
Rehnquist court's restrictions on federal
civil rights, environmental, health care and
other major 20th-century social legislation.
Their failure to unsheathe this weapon may
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stem from a wish to avoid bolstering the
legitimacy of the still-fragile federalism
jurisprudence. Their judicial allies-
Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer-
continue to dissent from the majority's
incursions on federal power. They continue
to assert that the new doctrinal protections
for states' rights are incorrect and "not the
law."
But whatever discomfort abortion rights
advocates may feel about a states' rights
assault on the latest abortion law, sooner or
later the issue will arise. For one thing, their
litigators have a professional, ethical
obligation to make every reasonable
argument available to advance the goals of
their clients who, as medical practitioners,
seek to perform abortions without exposure
to liability or litigation. When the hands of
abortion rights advocates are forced, all
parties may feel that they have been put on
the spot. Their mutual unease could
reinforce criticisms that the court's
federalism campaign is a solution without a
problem, and certainly without a
constituency.
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"U.S. Judge in San Francisco Strikes Down
Federal Law Banning Form of Abortion"
New York Times
June 2, 2004
Adam Liptak; Carolyn Marshall contributing
A federal judge in San Francisco yesterday
struck down a federal law that banned a
form of abortion, saying it created a risk of
criminal liability for virtually all abortions
performed after the first trimester. The law,
the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act, enacted
in November, makes it a crime for doctors to
perform any "overt act" to "kill the partially
delivered living fetus."
In a 117-page decision, the judge, Phyllis J.
Hamilton, ruled that the law was
unconstitutional in three ways. She said that
it placed an undue burden on women
seeking abortions, that its language was
dangerously vague and that it lacked a
required exception for medical actions
needed to preserve the woman's health.
The decision was the first ruling on the
merits of the law. Two other cases, in
Nebraska and New York, are pending. All
three judges had halted enforcement of the
law while they conducted trials.
The federal law is similar to a Nebraska law
struck down by the Supreme Court in 2000,
and yesterday's decision did not surprise
legal experts. Groups opposing abortion
said yesterday that they hoped the new cases
would give the Supreme Court an
opportunity to reconsider.
The White I louse said it would continue to
fight for the law.
"The president strongly disagrees with
today's California court ruling, which
overturns the overwhelming bipartisan
majority in Congress that voted to pass this
important legislation," the president's press
secretary, Scott McClellan, said in a
statement. "The president is committed to
building a culture of life in America, and the
administration will take every necessary step
to defend this law in the courts."
A Justice Department spokesman said that
lawyers were studying Judge Hamilton's
decision and that the department would
continue to litigate the other two cases
vigorously.
The California case was brought by the
Planned Parenthood Federation of America
and a local affiliate, and they were later
joined as plaintiffs by the city and county of
San Francisco. Yesterday's decision follows
a three-week trial in March and April before
Judge Hamilton, who was appointed by
President Bill Clinton.
Beth H. Parker, a San Francisco lawyer who
represented Planned Parenthood, said the
decision was "an enormous victory."
"It reaffirms that the government has no role
in this very intimate decision between the
woman and her physician," Ms. Parker
added. "Today's decision also gives
physicians the comfort that they don't have
to be concerned that the procedures
performed can expose them to two years in
prison for violating the act."
Ms. Parker, of the San Francisco law firm
Bingham McCutchen, said the decision
would protect doctors who work for local
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governments, as well as doctors affiliated
with Planned Parenthood clinics around the
nation. Judge Hamilton declined, however,
to issue a broader nationwide injunction, in
deference, she said, to the Nebraska and
New York courts.
Dennis Herrera, the city attorney in San
Francisco, said the decision would allow the
city to deliver a complete array of health
care options.
"The population that we service at San
Francisco General Hospital," Mr. Herrera
said, "many of them indigent and from the
minority communities, will continue to have
services and counseling available to them
with respect to their reproductive rights."
Substantial passages in Judge Hamilton's
decision concerned nomenclature. "The
term 'partial-birth abortion,"' she wrote, "is
neither recognized in the medical literature
nor used by physicians who routinely
perform second trimester abortions." She
referred to the procedure as intact dilation
and evacuation. It is also sometimes called
dilation and extraction. The law defines the
procedure as one in which the doctor
"deliberately and intentionally vaginally
delivers a living fetus" until either the head
or the body up to the navel is "outside the
body of the mother" and then kills it.
Judge Hamilton's ruling turned largely on
the testimony of medical experts. She said
they had demonstrated that the contested
procedure was a variant of and in some ways
safer than the most common form of
abortion used in the second trimester of
pregnancy, which she called dilation and
evacuation by disarticulation, in which the
fetus is typically not removed intact.
In that and other forms of abortion, Judge
Hamilton found, "the fetus may still have a
detectable heartbeat or pulsating umbilical
cord when uterine evacuation begins" and
thus "may be considered a 'living fetus."'
That means, she wrote, that the law could
apply to ban such abortions as well.
In the 2000 Supreme Court decision
concerning the Nebraska law, the court ruled
that the Constitution forbids placing "undue
burdens" on the right to abortion.
The California plaintiffs said the 2003 law
created a burden because common abortion
methods could violate the law. The
government said the law was meant to apply
only to the disfavored procedure.
Judge Hamilton, relying on the Supreme
Court decision, agreed with the plaintiffs.
She also noted that the law did not
distinguish between procedures used before
fetal viability and those used after, when the
government may regulate or ban abortion
except where it is necessary for the
preservation of the life or health of the
woman.
In ruling that the law is unconstitutionally
vague, Judge Hamilton wrote, "It deprives
physicians of fair notice and encourages
arbitrary enforcement." She objected in
particular to what she said were the
ambiguous terms "partial-birth abortion"
and "overt act."
Finally, Judge Hamilton said that the law did
not include a crucial exception required by
the Supreme Court. In the Nebraska case,
the court ruled that such laws must include
an exception for the preservation of the life
or health of the woman. The federal law
provides an exception for the woman's life
but not for her health.
Government lawyers said this was
defensible, since, they said, the procedure is
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never medically necessary.
Judge Hamilton disagreed, ruling that the
procedure is sometimes required and can be
safer than other forms of abortion. In those
other procedures, she wrote, fetal parts are
sometimes left in the uterus, creating a risk
to the woman's health. The contested
procedure is typically shorter, reducing the
risk for complications from anesthesia. And
relatively intact fetuses can be used in
autopsies, which can help in the planning of
The government suggested that doctors
fearful of prosecution under the law "could
simply effect fetal demise before performing
the procedure to escape liability under the
act," Judge Hamilton wrote. The plaintiffs
responded that they should not be required
to perform an additional medical procedure
"that poses some risk and no benefit to the
patient solely to protect themselves from
liability."
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further pregnancies.
"U.S. Court in New York Rejects
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban"
New York Times
August 27, 2004
Julia Preston
A federal judge in New York ruled
yesterday that a federal law banning a rarely
used method of abortion was
unconstitutional because it did not exempt
cases where the procedure might be
necessary to protect a woman's health.
The ruling, by Judge Richard Conway
Casey, came in a challenge brought by the
National Abortion Federation and seven
doctors to a November 2003 law that bans
the method known as partial-birth abortion.
Judge Casey determined that the Supreme
Court required, in a decision four years ago,
that any law limiting abortion must have a
clause permitting doctors to use a banned
procedure if they determine that the risk to a
woman's health would be greater without it.
The Supreme Court ruling "informed us that
this gruesome procedure may be outlawed
only if there exists a medical consensus that
there is no circumstance in which any
women could potentially benefit from it,"
Judge Casey wrote. The Supreme Court's
opinion struck down a state law in Nebraska.
The New York case, which was argued by
lawyers from the American Civil Liberties
Union, was one of three cases challenging
the partial-birth abortion law. On June 1, a
federal judge in California ruled the law
unconstitutional on similar but broader
grounds than Judge Casey cited. The Justice
Department has appealed that decision. A
challenge in Nebraska is still in federal court
there.
The ruling is a new blow to legislation that
abortion opponents have hailed as one of
their most significant victories. President
Bush strongly backed the bill.
Attorney General John Ashcroft said in
Washington yesterday that the Justice
Department would continue to defend the
law vigorously and would appeal the ruling.
A department statement quoted President
Bush, who had said the law would "end an
abhorrent practice and continue to build a
culture of life in America."
The ruling by Judge Casey, in United States
District Court for the Southern District of
New York, makes it considerably less likely
that the Bush administration will be able to
implement the law as it is currently written.
It also will shift the focus of the abortion
debate back to the Supreme Court and its
cornerstone 1973 ruling in Roe v. Wade
upholding a women's broad right to
abortion.
At issue is a procedure, generally used in the
second or third trimester of pregnancy, that
involves partially extracting an intact fetus
from a woman's uterus and then killing it by
emptying the brain from the skull. Also
known as D and X, for dilation and
extraction, it has been used in cases of rare
or unanticipated severe medical
complications of pregnancy.
After listening to doctors describe the
procedure in detail during 16 days of
hearings this spring, Judge Casey wrote that
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it is "gruesome, brutal, barbaric and
uncivilized." He cited medical experts'
testimony that the procedure subjects the
fetus to "severe pain."
He also dismissed much of the testimony by
A.C.L.U. witnesses, saying he did not
believe that many of their "purported
reasons for why DandX is medically
necessary are credible; rather they are
theoretical or false."
But Judge Casey was even more pointedly
critical of Congress, saying that it had voted
for the law without seriously examining the
medical issues. "This court heard more
evidence during its trial than Congress heard
over the span of eight years," the judge
wrote.
He found that Congress, in writing the law,
had ignored furious dissension among
doctors over the safety and necessity of the
disputed abortion. The lawmakers had
overlooked testimony in their own hearings,
he said, and based the bill on the conclusion
that partial-birth abortion is "never
necessary."
The law includes an exception if there is a
risk to a woman's life, but not a broader
exception if a doctor decides that there is a
risk to a patient's health. A violation is a
felony punished with up to two years in jail
and fines up to $250,000.
The A.C.L.U. suit did not center on
defending the procedure, but on contesting
the limitations in the law on doctors' and
women's ability to determine medical care.
"This is a great day for women's health,
because it means the Constitution holds that
doctors will treat women's health and not
Congress," said Talcott Camp, an A.C.L.U.
lawyer in the case.
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"Partial Birth is First Hurdle"
National Law Journal
November 29, 2004
Jay Sekulow
With a number of retirements likely at the
U.S. Supreme Court, the speculation begins
about whether a shift in the court would
result in overturning long-standing decisions
like Roe v. Wade.
To many it is clear that Roe was wrongly
decided nearly 32 years ago. The high court
declared that human children prior to birth
are not "persons" for purposes of the 14th
Amendment. Many believe the ruling itself
is unconstitutional because it drives a wedge
between biological humanity [which
prenatal human offspring definitely have]
and legal personhood [i.e., the right to the
equal protection of the law]. Born human
children, by contrast, indisputably enjoy the
basic rights secured to all persons under the
14th Amendment. Consider, for example,
Levyv. Louisiana [1968].
What is not so clear, though, is whether Roe
could be overturned during the next four
years as new appointments to the court are
made.
First, overturning Roe is a worthy goal. It is
bad law. It is legally flawed. However, it
would take a major shift on the court for that
to happen. Looking into the crystal ball at
the Supreme Court does not always produce
a clear picture. To overturn Roe, there
would need to be numerous retirements-and
replacements with justices who believe Roe
was wrongly decided. All complicated and
unpredictable scenarios.
Is it possible? Yes. Probable? Hard to tell.
What is probable, though, is a court that is
reshaped and likely to embrace additional,
reasonable restrictions on abortion-most
significantly, upholding the national ban on
partial-birth abortion.
A ban on partial-birth abortion operates at
the borderline between prenatal and
postnatal life. As a consequence of Roe, this
border separates, in the eyes of the federal
judiciary, human nonpersons from human
persons.
Partial-birth procedures represent the
beachhead of abortion's assault on postnatal
life, the bridge between abortion and
infanticide. Partial-birth procedures open
the way to legal infanticide.
When the Supreme Court considered the
issue in Stenberg v. Carhart in 2000, the
court declared Nebraska's ban on partial-
birth abortion unconstitutional. But the
issue was decided by the slimmest of
margins [5-4]. The four dissenting justices-
Chief Justice William Rehnquist and justices
Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and
Anthony Kennedy-took the opportunity to
speak about their decision-and their
pronouncements sent shock waves well
beyond the legal community.
An outspoken dissent
In an unusual move, several of the justices
who dissented spoke from the bench,
highlighting this gruesome procedure.
Kennedy criticized the majority, saying "the
majority views the [partial-birth abortion]
procedures from the perspective of the
abortionist, rather than from the perspective
638
of a society shocked when confronted with a
new method of ending human life."
Thomas was even more pointed: "The
court," he said, "inexplicably holds that the
states cannot constitutionally prohibit a
method of abortion that millions find hard to
distinguish from infanticide."
And Scalia said, "the method of killing a
human child-one cannot even accurately say
an entirely unborn human child-proscribed
by this statute is so horrible that the most
clinical description of it evokes a shudder of
revulsion."
The procedure itself brought sharp reaction
from the dissenters. In the words of Thomas:
"The physician literally sucks the fetus'
brain from the skull."
Now, four years later, this issue is on the
fast track to the Supreme Court once again.
The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003
was declared unconstitutional by federal
courts in New York, Nebraska and
California. The cases are now before the 2d,
8th and 9th U.S. circuit courts of appeal.
Those cases could end up at the Supreme
Court next term.
And with a number of replacements likely at
the high court, a one-vote swing could result
in a decision that allows some modicum of
legal protections for the most vulnerable
among us.
It is certainly possible that a reshaped court
could conclude that a human being who is
partially outside the mother's body is a
person entitled to the equal protection of the
law under the 14th and Fifth amendments.
These amendments secure protection for the
basic, minimum human rights any
government must respect. At the same time,
governments, and all their people, have a
tremendously important stake in the
unqualified prohibition of partial-birth
abortion. The child who "crosses the goal
line," by foot or head, into the realm of
judicially recognized "personhood" must
receive the full protection of the law if we
are not to abandon, inexorably, the sanctity
of postnatal life as well.
President George W. Bush has repeatedly
said he has no litmus test for nominees,
including those for the Supreme Court. In a
post-election news conference, Bush said
when there is a vacancy on the high court,
he would select someone "who knows the
difference between personal opinion and the
strict interpretation of the law." We take
Bush's pledge seriously.
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Affirmative Action
"Judges Back Jefferson Desegregation Plan"
Courier-Journal
July 22, 2005
Chris Kenning
Jefferson County Public Schools' racial
desegregation plan has survived another
legal challenge-and appears headed to the
U.S. Supreme Court.
The 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
yesterday affirmed a federal judge's 2004
ruling upholding the district's racial
guidelines, which maintain black student
enrollment at most of its 153 schools
between 15 percent and 50 percent.
About 35 percent of the district's 97,000
students are black.
"This is a strong endorsement," said Pat
Todd, district director of student assignment.
"It puts us in a good position for any appeal
to the Supreme Court."
That likely will happen, said Ted Gordon,
attorney for Jefferson County parent Crystal
Meredith, who sued the district over its
desegregation plan.
"I will consult with my client and in all
likelihood look forward to proceeding with
an appeal to the Supreme Court," Gordon
said.
Meredith said her son, Joshua, was denied a
transfer to another school because of his
race, and his education suffered because he
remained in the lower-performing school.
Jefferson County's case is one of several
working their way through the nation's
federal courts that ultimately may determine
whether schools, in the absence of a court
order, can promote diversity by voluntarily
considering race when assigning students.
No such cases have yet reached the Supreme
Court, and Louisville's could be among the
first.
School plans changing
More school districts are abandoning their
desegregation plans, including in Charlotte,
N.C., where parents sued in the late 1990s
and forced the school system to dismantle its
busing program.
"The nation has seen a waning of court-
ordered desegregation," said Chinh Quang
Le, assistant counsel for the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund. The latest
cases, he said, will address the question of
"what's the next chapter?"
Last month, the 1st U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld a Lynn, Mass., school
desegregation plan that bars transfers that
harm racial diversity. That case could also
be appealed, Le said.
Maintaining diversity
Jefferson County has continued to
desegregate its schools since a 1974 federal
decree was lifted in 2000. The district's
policy was intended to keep schools diverse
in the face of persistent neighborhood
segregation.
It uses a system that allows parents some
choice among schools while using the 15-50
racial guidelines to maintain diversity. Most
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students are placed in schools of their
choice, district officials say, although the
guidelines can lead to some children being
bused long distances.
The Jefferson County district is considered a
model of desegregation at a time when most
of the nation's African-American students
attend predominantly black schools that are
beset by high poverty, less experienced
teachers, fewer resources and lower
expectations, according to experts.
And a 2001 district survey found that more
than 80 percent of parents supported the
desegregation plan.
"Most parents value the diversity," said
Paula Wolf , who has two children in
Jefferson County high schools.
All schools equal?
But Gordon says that the district's schools
are not all equal and that denying students
admission to a school because of their race
is unconstitutional.
Meredith was among four white parents who
in 2002 sued over the plan's use at
traditional magnet and other schools.
The district argued that removing racial
guidelines would resegregate many schools
and especially hurt black students, because
they're most likely to attend schools beset by
poverty. They also said that all students
have benefited academically and socially by
attending desegregated schools.
U.S. District Judge John Heyburn II agreed,
ruling last June that the district can justify
maintaining desegregated schools because it
improves education and tolerance. He said
the district's plan doesn't unduly harm any
group, since all its schools basically have the
same funding and curriculum.
But Heyburn did order the district to drop an
admission system for its nine traditional
magnet schools that separated applicants by
race and sex before they were chosen.
That change takes effect this school year.
Because Meredith was the only parent
whose child attended a non-traditional,
regular program school, she alone proceeded
with the appeal.
'Well-reasoned opinion'
Yesterday, the 6th Circuit appeals court
concurred with Heyburn, writing that
Heyburn's ruling was a "well-reasoned
opinion" and therefore did not warrant a full
written opinion.
The 6th Circuit judges agreed with Heyburn
that the student-assignment plan was
constitutionally sound because the district
had a "compelling interest to use the racial
guidelines" and "applied them in a manner
that was narrowly tailored to realize its
goals."
At a Glance
Jefferson County's desegregation plan has
evolved from mandatory busing to
"managed choice," which allows most
parents to choose from among groups of
schools.
School choices are granted on several
conditions, including that schools maintain a
black student enrollment that is at least 15
percent and no more than 50 percent.
Four schools are exempted from the
guidelines because they offer unique
programs: Central High, Manual High, The
Brown School and Brandeis Elementary.
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"Jefferson Suit Is Expected to Proceed"
Courier-Journal
June 24, 2003
Chris Kenning
The U.S. Supreme Court decision yesterday
allowing colleges and universities to admit
students based partly on race clears the way
for five Louisville parents to continue their
lawsuit challenging Jefferson County Public
Schools' desegregation policy.
The University of Michigan affirmative-
action case covered issues similar to those in
the Louisville lawsuit ; that prompted the
judge and attorneys for both sides to agree to
put the Louisville lawsuit on hold until a
Supreme Court ruling was issued.
In two decisions involving the University of
Michigan, the Supreme Court underscored
that racial quotas are unconstitutional but
left room for public universities-and by
extension other public and private
institutions-to seek ways to take race into
account.
The ruling failed to give either Jefferson
County school officials or the white parents
challenging the district's desegregation
policy the clear victory they had hoped for,
lawyers for both sides said.
As a result, the lawsuit likely will go to trial
to determine whether the district must
dismantle its 25-year-old diversity policy.
The district buses thousands of students to
keep African-American enrollment between
15 percent and 50 percent at all but four of
its 152 schools.
"The district's use of race was
unconstitutional before this ruling, and it's
unconstitutional afterward," said attorney
Ted Gordon, who represents five parents
who say the district relies on race to
unconstitutionally deny their children
enrollment in the schools they wanted to
attend.
District officials have said race is only one
of many factors they consider in assigning
students to schools.
Plaintiff Teresa Hartnett said she's relieved
that the trial can go forward. Hartnett said
her children-Jaclyn, 5, and Jessica, 8-
were denied entry to Audubon Traditional
Elementary School because of their race,
which she thinks is illegal.
"It's hard to tell your children why they can't
get into a school," she said yesterday.
"What do you say, 'I'm sorry, you're not the
right color?"'
Gordon said the ruling could improve his
clients' case because the justices signaled
that race can't be the determining factor for
admission. That is What is happening in
Jefferson County, he said.
But Byron Leet, an attorney contracted to
represent the Jefferson County school
district, said the Supreme Court's ruling isn't
directly applicable to the Jefferson County
lawsuit because admission to an elite
university is far different from assignments
to public schools that generally are equal.
The U.S. Supreme Court in 1978 struck
down racial quotas in schools but said race
can be one factor in determining admission.
But as legal challenges have mounted
nationwide in recent years, some schools
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have abandoned their diversity policies.
Experts had said that the Michigan case's
outcome, depending on how broadly it was
worded, could affect K-12 education
policies.
The high court's ruling yesterday affirmed
the less-structured use of race in admissions
at the University of Michigan law school but
struck down an undergraduate policy that
awarded minority applicants 20 points on a
150-point index toward admittance. Justices
said it was tantamount to a quota and
violated the equal-protection clause of the
14th Amendment.
Michael Simpson, assistant general counsel
for the National Education Association, said
yesterday that although uncertainties remain,
the ruling means that school districts
probably can craft race-related policies as
long as they aren't quotas.
U.S. District Judge John G. Heyburn II
likely will hold a conference with the
attorneys before determining the next step in
the lawsuit, lawyers said. Heyburn could
not be reached yesterday afternoon for
comment.
The Jefferson County lawsuit was filed last
fall on behalf of David McFarland, who
argued that his sons, ages 11 and 6 at the
time, were denied enrollment at Jefferson
County Traditional Middle School and
Schaffner Traditional Elementary School
because of their race. McFarland, who is
white, argued that the denial violated the
U.S. Constitution and a previous federal
court ruling because Jefferson County's
traditional schools offer special benefits that
students can't receive in non traditional
public schools.
Heyburn ruled in 2000 that the school
district had to stop considering race when
assigning students to four magnet schools,
which he said offered students special
benefits. Gordon also was the attorney in the
magnet school case, representing parents of
five black students who were denied entry to
Central High School.
Four more parents joined McFarland's
lawsuit earlier this year, including one from
a school with a regular program. That
broadened the scope of the case to include
racial guidelines at all Jefferson County
public schools, which serve 96,000 students.
Last month, the parents filed for an
injunction asking Heyburn to temporarily
halt the use of race in school assignments
until the case is decided. Even if the case
goes their way, they argued, their children
wouldn't see benefits until the fall of 2004.
Heyburn hasn't ruled on the injunction
request.
Officials with the district say racial
guidelines provide critical educational
benefits, including improved academic
performance for both black and white
students and better race relations.
Pat Todd, director of student assignment,
has said drawing up an alternative student-
assignment plan would take at least a year.
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"Court Backs Lynn Use of Race in School Plan"
Boston Globe
June 17, 2005
Shelley Murphy and Maria Sacchetti
A federal appeals court yesterday ruled that
the Lynn public schools could continue
using race as a factor in student transfers,
opening the door for other school systems to
devise similar ways to guarantee diversity in
schools.
The 3-to-2 decision on Lynn's voluntary
desegregation plan offers an alternative for
school systems at a time when most courts
have eliminated busing and other mandatory
race-based policies for assigning students.
Lynn chose to create its own desegregation
plan in the 1980s, hoping to prevent racial
strife and segregation. Its case is one of a
few nationwide that could redefine the role
race could play in assigning students to
schools.
But the ruling is not necessarily the final
word on the issue. The plaintiffs in the
Lynn case, a group of white and minority
parents, say they will appeal to the US
Supreme Court, which has never weighed in
on voluntary desegregation plans in public
schools.
Lynn lets students attend their neighborhood
schools, regardless of race, but students
cannot change schools if their departure
would make either school more racially
imbalanced. The plaintiffs complained that
the student assignment system was
discriminatory and denied their children a
place in schools because of race.
"This is precedent-making," said Gary
Orfield, a Harvard education professor and
director of the Civil Rights Project, who
testified in support of Lynn during the
federal trial. "It could be the beginning of a
reopening of a desegregation effort. It
recognizes the very positive benefits of
something that has been attacked widely."
The US Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, in the majority opinion written by
Judge Kermit V. Lipez, said race relations
and academic achievement in Lynn
improved under the policy.
"We are persuaded by the extensive expert
testimony in the record, rooted in
observations specific to Lynn, that there are
significant educational benefits to be derived
from a racially diverse student body in the
K-12 context," the court wrote. "Lynn has a
compelling interest in obtaining those
benefits."
Judge Bruce M. Selya, who was on a three-
judge appeals court panel that found the
Lynn plan unconstitutional in October,
wrote the dissent.
"The majority's eagerness to justify
departing from precedent frees it to strike
out on its own, fashioning a rule that flies in
the teeth of the Supreme Court's stalwart
opposition to the use of inflexible, race-
determinative methods in granting or
denying benefits to citizens," Selya wrote.
Lynn crafted its voluntary desegregation
plan in the late 1980s. Students are not
required to move to another school to
achieve racial balance, but beginning in
1989, if they wanted to switch schools, they
could be denied a transfer if it would upset
the racial balance.
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A school is considered balanced if its
nonwhite enrollment is close to the district
average, 47 to 77 percent of an elementary
school's student body. Roughly a third of
Lynn's students choose to attend a school
other than their neighborhood school.
In Massachusetts, the ruling allowing Lynn
to keep race as a factor will help 21 other
school systems with voluntary desegregation
plans, educators say. The point, they say, is
that the judges have said that race can be
used in some fashion.
"This decision allows cities like us and Lynn
and other cities to do what we think is best
for education," said Salem School
Superintendent Herb Levine. "Some people
would call it social engineering, and so be it.
But what it really is is that segregated
schools don't work for minority kids. They
don't work for white kids either, especially
in the world as it is today."
Boston attorney Michael Williams, who
represents families in the suit against Lynn,
said students in Lynn and elsewhere can
achieve academically without any specific
racial mix. He said the system has improved
because of a change in demographics.
Chester Darling, an attorney who also
represents the plaintiffs, said yesterday's
ruling "grates against improved race
relations" by allowing Lynn to keep a plan
that rejects transfers based solely on race.
"What this case says is people are defined
by their color," he said. "And you don't
define people by their color."
Since the early 1990s, courts have released
many school systems from court-ordered
desegregation plans, leading to complaints
that many schools have become
predominantly minority again, said Chinh
Le, a lawyer with the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund in New York. In 1998, a
federal court threw out the use of race in
admissions to Boston's exam schools.
Yesterday's decision offers the highest
judicial endorsement of a voluntary effort to
desegregate schools, Le said.
"There have been a number of cases that
have led to resegregation, and this case may
be an antidote for that," said Le.
The ruling while it only affects states under
the First Circuit: Massachusetts, Maine,
Rhode Island, and New Hampshire, plus
Puerto Rico could also influence pending
legal battles elsewhere in the nation, he and
Orfield said. Last year, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals threw out the Seattle
public schools' high school assignment
policy, which used race as a factor.
But, as occurred in the Lynn case, Seattle
school officials have been granted a
rehearing, scheduled for next week, before a
larger panel of appeals court judges.
Louisville, Ky., school officials, meanwhile,
argued before the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals last week and are awaiting a ruling
on whether their voluntary plan is
constitutional.
Massachusetts Attorney General Thomas F.
Reilly, whose office had defended Lynn's
plan in court, said the voluntary system
works and "its goal is to prepare the children
of Lynn for the world they will live in and
work in."
The 14,300-student school system is 62
percent minority, and many credit the
voluntary plan with striking a compromise
on integration that averted the racial tensions
that shattered Boston in the mid-1970s with
court-ordered busing. But in 1999, a group
of white, black, and Hispanic parents filed a
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lawsuit asserting that the policy was
discriminatory,
Lynn's voluntary plan has not achieved
balance in all schools. About half of the
elementary schools and most middle schools
have reached district averages for racial
balance. The high schools are more diverse,
and students can more easily transfer from
one to the other, according to the court
ruling. But Lynn officials say most schools
are more diverse than they would have been
if the school system didn't use race as a
factor. Shoemaker Elementary School is 70
percent white, but would be almost all-white
without the plan.
Barbara George, Shoemaker's PTA
president, said she wanted her children to
grow up in a diverse school, even if her
neighborhood is largely white.
"I'm grateful for diversity," said George,
who is white. "It enhances my children's
experiences."
In last October's ruling against Lynn, the
judges said racial distinctions should always
be a last resort. They cited a 2003 decision
by the US Supreme Court that upheld the
University of Michigan's law school
admissions policy, ruling that universities
may use race as a factor, but not the sole
factor, in admissions to achieve a diverse
student body.
Yesterday's ruling upheld a 2003 decision
by US District Judge Nancy Gertner, who
found Lynn's plan was constitutional.
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"Judge OK's Use of Race in School Assigning"
Boston Globe
June 7, 2003
Thanassis Cambanis
A US District Court judge yesterday upheld
Lynn's school desegregation plan, ruling it
does not violate the Constitution-the first
federal case in the country to deal with
voluntary, rather than court-ordered, race-
conscious school assignment plans.
Judge Nancy Gertner issued a 156-page
decision on the eve of an expected US
Supreme Court ruling on whether
universities may consider race in the
admissions process.
She ruled that race may be considered when
assigning students in grades kindergarten
through 12, so long as the school system can
demonstrate a compelling interest and tailors
its program narrowly enough to minimize
any disruption to students.
The decision lends protection to the 22
school districts in Massachusetts that have
voluntary desegregation plans, and could
affect race-based public school assignment
programs across the country. Lawyers say
the ruling is likely to be contested up to the
US Supreme Court.
"The issues raised in this litigation are
critically important, not just for the parties,
but for the nation," Gertner wrote. "The
Lynn plan does not entail coercive
assignments or forced busing; nor does it
prefer one race over another. The message
it conveys to the students is that our society
is heterogeneous, that racial harmony
matters a message that cannot be conveyed
meaningfully in segregated schools."
At stake is whether school districts such as
Lynn, which are under no court order to do
so, can take race into account when they
assign students.
Her ruling-which the plaintiffs plan to
appeal-carves out a rationale for school
districts to create desegregation programs.
It also upholds the state's Racial Imbalance
Act, a law dating to 1965 that provides
additional funding to districts with
desegregation plans.
Lawycrs for the seven families
challenged Lynn's desegregation plan
they would appeal the decision.
who
said
The judge "can deploy all of the perfumed
politically correct language she wants in this
decision, but the reality is that these kids are
being pushed around because of their race,"
said Chester Darling, who is president of
Citizens for the Preservation of
Constitutional Rights and one of the
plaintiffs' lawyers.
Over the last 15 years, federal courts have
consistently dissolved forced desegregation
orders and have struck down policies that
require students to attend schools far from
their homes for the sake of racial diversity.
A series of court decisions has also struck
down university admissions policies that
provide advantages to minority groups. The
Supreme Court is expected to issue a ruling
by the end of June in two cases against the
University of Michigan, which challenge
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that institution's race-conscious admissions
policies.
Richard Cole, who is the senior counsel for
civil rights in the Massachusetts attorney
general's office and represents the Lynn
school system, said, "There is potential that
this could be the ground-breaking test case
before the US Supreme Court on how
important it is to have children of all
different ethnic groups educated together."
Gertner ruled that decisions about
affirmative action in higher education or the
job market-where people are competing
for a limited number of positions-do not
apply to public K-12 education, where the
government has a "compelling interest" in
teaching citizenship.
Lynn-encouraged by the state
government-crafted its current voluntary
desegregation program in September 1989
because the school district was suffering
from white flight from predominantly
minority schools, plummeting performance,
and racial and ethnic violence.
Under the plan, Lynn students are
guaranteed placement in their neighborhood
school. But they may not transfer to a
school outside their neighborhood if it
upsets the racial balance at either school.
Tom Hutton, a staff attorney for the National
School Boards Association, said public
school officials across the country would
take heart from Gertner's decision, which
protects for the time being at least one
strategy school systems have used to
maintain racial balance.
"The problem of de facto segregation in our
schools is worsening, and lots of school
districts are grappling with it," Hutton said.
"Schools need to have tools to deal with it."
Chinh Quang Le, assistant counsel for the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, said the
Supreme Court's ruling in the Michigan
cases should not affect Gertner's ruling, due
to the differences between the competitive
market for higher education and the
inclusive and universal nature of primary
and secondary schooling.
"Our hope is that this opinion will encourage
more school districts to seek proactively to
address issues of isolation and diversity in
their schools," Le said.
Yesterday's decision is only binding in
Massachusetts, but since it marks the first
time a federal district judge has ruled on
voluntary desegregation plans, it will be
closely watched across the country.
"This is a great victory for public school
students and for civil rights," Massachusetts
Attorney General Thomas Reilly said
yesterday.
"Lynn's integrated elementary schools have
allowed Lynn's youngest students to develop
a deep appreciation and respect for people of
different races, promoting tolerance among
Lynn students," he said.
The US Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit will have to decide whether Gertner's
distinction between K-12 education and
higher education is appropriate.
At an 11-day trial before Gertner last
summer, parents, educators, and specialists
testified about whether the Lynn program
had successfully remedied problems in the
school system, and about the costs and
benefits of the program for its students.
"It's time to go back to neighborhood
schools, where you don't use race in
placement," said Christine H. Rossell, a
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political science professor at Boston
University who testified for the plaintiffs.
"Our goal is supposed to be a color-blind
society," Rossell said, adding that she
believed the Appeals Court would overturn
Gertner's decision because the Lynn school
system could maintain a racially harmonious
environment without the existing school
assignment plan.
In 1974, nearly a decade after Massachusetts
passed the Racial Imbalance Act, US
District Judge W. Arthur Garrity Jr. ordered
Boston to desegregate its school system, a
decision followed by widespread strife.
Boston has now abandoned race as a factor
in school assignments.
Still, many education specialists who
followed the Lynn trial said yesterday that
public school integration was still a live
issue.
"Affirmative action is under attack
nationwide," said Gary Orfield, a professor
of education and social policy at Harvard
University who testified for the Lynn
schools. "The decision is a very strong
affirmation of integration as a goal that can
be reasonably achieved with voluntary
techniques."
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"A World Without Color;
Segregation Deprives White Children Too"
Boston Herald
March 27, 2005
Howard Manly
Given all the talk about a "New Boston"
and a majority-minority city, it's probably a
good time to take a look at a segment of
Boston that is rarely discussed-white
students.
By all accounts, they are performing better
than minorities on standardized tests,
graduating at higher rates, attending colleges
and finding jobs. The one thing they are not
receiving is any sense of cultural diversity.
Despite the last 50 years of courageous
effort to racially balance public schools, a
goal consistently upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court as a compelling national
interest, Boston's schools are more racially
isolated than ever. Although much has been
made of increasing the quality of education
that all children receive, racial diversity and
the benefits of understanding different
cultures and ethnicities barely receives a
mention.
But public education is not just about
reading, writing and arithmetic. As noted
Harvard scholar Gary Orfield explains, "The
vast majority of white students are isolated
from students of color, depriving them of the
experience of interacting with those of
different racial and ethnic backgrounds,
skills that will become even more critical as
Metro Boston and the nation as a whole
become increasingly multiracial."
The numbers documenting the racial
isolation tell part of the story. During the
2001-2002 school year, seven in 10 white
students attended schools in the suburbs that
were more than 90 percent white. The
Boston Public Schools, for instance,
enrolled just 2 percent of the area's white
students.
Of white students living in Boston, about 44
percent attended private schools-schools
that are largely white.
In stark contrast, one of every five black or
Latino students attend schools in urban
poverty-stricken areas. According to a
recent study by the Civil Rights Project at
Harvard University, 97 percent of the
intensely segregated minority schools (those
more than 90 percent minority) have a
majority of students who are eligible for free
or reduced-price lunch, compared to only 1
percent of schools composed of more than
90 percent white students.
Some 61 percent of black students in Boston
Public Schools attend schools that are more
than 90 percent nonwhite. For Latino
students, that number is 54 percent who'
attend schools that are more than 90 percent
nonwhite.
Based on standardized test results, separate
schools clearly are not equal. About 96
percent of students attending majority white
schools pass the English language arts
portion of the MCAS. Only 61 percent of
the students attending majority-minority
schools passed that portion of the exam. As
the Civil Rights project reported, "Children
in segregated schools often experience
conditions of concentrated disadvantage,
including less-experienced or unqualified
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teachers, fewer demanding pre-collegiate
courses and more remedial courses, and
higher teacher turnover."
The majority of white students don't face
those sorts of problems. Nor should their
parents be blamed for wanting the best for
their children, and that usually means not
attending public schools in the inner city.
But what those white students face is a
deficiency of cultural knowledge that the
U.S. Supreme Court deemed vital to the
national interest. In its 2003 ruling
upholding the use of race in college
admissions, U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor concluded that
"numerous studies show that student body
diversity promotes learning outcomes and
better prepares students for an increasingly
diverse work force and society, and better
prepares them as professionals."
O'Connor went on: "These benefits are not
theoretical but real, as major American
businesses have made clear that skills
needed in today's increasingly global
marketplace can only be developed through
exposure to widely diverse people, cultures,
ideas and viewpoints. . . ."
Though that might be happening at the
University of Michigan and other colleges
across the country, it is not happening in
Boston-area public schools. Based on
housing patterns coupled with the apparent
reluctance of white parents to send their
children to public schools, there is precious
little that school officials can do to lure
white students back to urban school settings.
That means more racial isolation, less
understanding and a "New Boston" that is
almost worse than the "Old Boston."
Court challenges, such as the one against the
city of Lynn's voluntary desegregation
program, are only part of the problem. It's
nearly impossible these days to solve a race-
based problem with a race-neutral policy,
and though other factors such as poverty and
English-language skills should be
considered, the argument for diversity is
relatively simple. Diversity is a good thing,
largely because it helps eliminate ignorance
and damaging racial stereotypes in the
minds of both whites and blacks and,
increasingly, Latinos and Asians.
Integrated schools are not simply about
minority schoolchildren sitting next to white
students, and receiving the benefits that
accrue from attending schools with better
resources, better teachers, more challenging
classes and an academically competitive
atmosphere.
It's about producing future leaders who are
able to function across racial lines. Of
course, balancing public schools along racial
and ethnic lines does not ignore the
inequalities of society as a whole. But that
has been the challenge of public schools not
just since the days of busing in the 1970s but
since the 1850s when the city received its
first legal challenge to integrate its school
system.
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell
recognized the importance of racial diversity
26 years ago in his opinion in the Bakke
case that upheld affirmative action. Though
taking great pains to emphasize that race
was only one factor that should be used in
admissions policies and that everyone was
entitled to equal protection, Powell argued
that nothing less than the "nation's future
depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure to the ideas and mores of students
as diverse as this Nation of many peoples."
It was a worthy goal then and it's even a
worthier goal now. It's unfortunate that very
few really believe it.
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Felon Voting Rights
"Supreme Court Declines to Hear Two Cases
Weighing the Right of Felons to Vote"
New York Times
November 9, 2004
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court on Monday declined to
hear cases from New York and Washington
State on whether states violate the federal
Voting Rights Act when they strip felons of
the right to vote. But with 48 states, all
except Maine and Vermont,
disenfranchising millions of people who
have been convicted of crimes, the issue
remains very much alive in the lower courts,
and the justices' action did not foreclose
accepting a future case.
The Voting Rights Act prohibits states from
applying any "voting qualification or
prerequisite" in a manner that has a racially
discriminatory effect. Inmates and their
advocates who are bringing the lawsuits
point out that the impact of the felon-
disenfranchisement laws falls
disproportionately on members of minority
groups, particularly on black men. The
number of people barred from voting under
the state laws is estimated to be 3.9 million,
with more than one-third of them black men.
The statistics are not disputed. But whether
Congress intended the Voting Rights Act to
apply to this situation is very much in
dispute. Congress passed the original Voting
Rights Act in 1965 and amended it in 1982
to make clear that it barred voting policies
that had not only the intent but also the
effect of discriminating by race.
Two federal appeals courts differed on the
question in the cases that the justices
considered and turned down on Monday. In
the case from Washington State, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
permitted a lawsuit by six felons to go
forward. In a similar case brought by a New
York inmate serving a life sentence for
murder, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit dismissed the lawsuit
on the ground that the Voting Rights Act did
not apply.
The Washington case, Locke v. Farrakhan,
No. 03-1597, was filed by four black men,
one Hispanic man, and one American
Indian. All were in prison on felony
convictions or had recently been released.
Washington has stripped felons of their right
to vote since before it became a state, and
the prohibition against voting by "all persons
convicted of an infamous crime" is part of
its constitution. The prohibition is lifelong
unless lifted by a pardon, clemency or by a
sentencing review board.
The Federal District Court in Seattle
dismissed the lawsuit, but the Ninth Circuit,
which sits in San Francisco, reinstated it,
sending the case back to the District Court
for further examination of racial bias in
Washington's criminal justice system. The
state appealed to the Supreme Court.
In the New York case, Muntaqim v.
Coombe, No. 04-175, a black man, Jalil
Abdul Muntaqim, serving a life sentence for
murder, filed his own lawsuit in challenging
New York's law, which is less extensive
than Washington's and applies only to those
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who are in prison or on parole. The Federal
District Court in Syracuse dismissed the
case. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, in Manhattan, also
ruled against him, finding that in the absence
of a "clear statement" from Congress, the
Voting Rights Act should not be interpreted
to apply to the disenfranchisement of felons,
The inmate, now represented by a team of
lawyers, appealed to the Supreme Court.
Now that the justices have denied review, it
is likely that the appeals court will revisit the
issue. A majority of the circuit's judges
have indicated that they would grant a
request to rehear the case, which was
decided by a three-judge panel, if the
Supreme Court turned down the appeal.
Last month, the 11 judges of the full United
States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit,
which sits in Atlanta, heard arguments in a
case challenging Florida's life-long felon
disenfranchisement law, which bans an
estimated 600,000 state residents from
voting. The plaintiffs presented evidence
that Florida's law, which dates to 1868, was
enacted with the intention of keeping the
newly enfranchised blacks from voting.
A three-judge panel of the 1 Ith Circuit had
ruled that the lawsuit could go to trial, but
the full court vacated that decision and
granted Florida's request for re-argument.
Lawyers for the plaintiffs in the Florida case
filed a brief with the Supreme Court in the
Washington case to make sure the justices
were aware of the Florida lawsuit.
Many lawyers following the issue believe
that the Florida case, which is being handled
by lawyers from the University of North
Carolina School of Law and the Brennan
Center for Justice at New York University,
is the strongest of the lawsuits because the
facts have been extensively developed and
the state's history of discrimination is clear.
The brief urged the justices not to grant the
Washington case but to wait for the Florida
case.
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"11th Circuit Upholds Ban on Felon Voting"
Fulton County Daily Report
April 14, 2005
Dan Christensen
MIAMI-In a decision fraught with partisan
political overtones, the full 11th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals in Atlanta has upheld an
1868 Florida law that generally bars felons
from voting even after they've finished
serving their prison sentences. Tuesday's
10-2 ruling widens an existing split of
opinion on the issue among the federal
appellate courts across the country, and
could set the stage for the U.S. Supreme
Court to resolve the issue. The decision
affirmed a 2002 summary judgment by U.S.
District Senior Judge James Lawrence King
in Miami. In September 2000, in the midst
of the Bush-Gore presidential election
campaign, Thomas Johnson and six other
ex-felons sued Gov. Jeb Bush and his
cabinet in U.S. District Court in Miami,
claiming the anti-felon law was a form of
illegal discrimination. They argued that it
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
14th Amendment and the federal Voting
Rights Act. The defendants are all members
of Florida's Clemency Board. The plaintiffs,
represented by attorneys from the Brennan
Center for Justice at the New York
University School of Law, filed the class
action on behalf of an estimated 600,000
Florida felons who have completed their
prison sentences but cannot vote. Under the
law, felons can't "vote or hold office" until
they convince the clemency board to restore
their civil rights. Felons must petition for
that status. There is no automatic review.
The issue has been especially controversial
in Florida, where the purging of felons from
voter roles in 2000 and 2004 was widely
seen as flawed, resulting in the mistaken
exclusion of non-felon voters.
In addition, Gov. Bush and legislative
Republican leaders have resisted growing
calls for easing the restoration of voting and
other civil rights to felons after they
complete their sentences. There also is a
major partisan factor involved in the issue.
A disproportionate percentage of felons in
Florida are African-Americans, and blacks
vote heavily Democratic. In a state where
7.6 million Floridians cast ballots in last
year's presidential election, the possible
inclusion of 600,000 felon voters could
swing close races. But the 11th Circuit, in
an opinion noting that approximately 70
percent of the plaintiff class is white, tossed
the case out of court in a 79-page ruling.
Eleven judges rejected the first prong of the
plaintiffs' attack, that Florida's current felon
disenfranchisement law was motivated by
intentional discrimination. Ten judges also
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that Section
2 of the Voting Rights Act extended to
considering claims of racial discrimination
regarding the disenfranchisement of felons.
There were two dissenters. Judge Rosemary
Barkett dissented from both findings. Judge
Charles R. Wilson agreed with the majority
that there was no evidence of intentional
discrimination. But he disagreed with its
conclusion that claims of racial
discrimination in felon disenfranchisement
laws "are not cognizable" under the act.
Judge Stanley Marcus, a former U.S.
attorney in Miami, recused himself from the
case. Critics of the Florida law vowed to
fight on to win voting rights for felons.
"This is a terribly unjust law that needs to be
fixed," said Jessie Allen, lead attorney for
the plaintiffs and associate counsel at the
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Brennan Center. "The law's undemocratic
consequences are creating a civil rights
crisis in the state of Florida." Legal and
political battles have raged for years across
the country over felon disenfranchisement.
According to the Sentencing Project, a
Washington-based nonprofit group, most
states have laws disenfranchising felons and
ex-felons. But only Florida, Alabama, Iowa,
Kentucky and Virginia provide no automatic
process for restoration of civil rights. While
the 11th Circuit majority said it had little
doubt that racial bigotry motivated some
provisions of Florida's Reconstruction-era
constitution, the majority found that such
discrimination does not "establish that racial
animus motivated the criminal
disenfranchisement provision, particularly
given Florida's long-standing tradition of
criminal disenfranchisement. "Besides, the
court said, the law was re-enacted in 1968
during a general revision of the state's
constitution. Similarly, the judges ruled that
the plaintiffs failed to provide any
"contemporaneous evidence" from 1868 to
prove discrimination. The plaintiffs'
reference to racist remarks made by a white
delegate to the 1868 Constitutional
Convention about keeping blacks from
taking over the state were rejected by the
full court as unconvincing. Those remarks
had helped persuade a three-judge panel of
the 11th Circuit not to dismiss the suit in
December 2003.
Headed to High Court? The plaintiffs' claim
that Florida's law violates the Voting Rights
Act also was found wanting by the full court
Tuesday. The legislative history of the act
shows that "Congress never intended" it to
reach state laws regarding felon
disenfranchisement, the opinion says Loyola
University (Los Angeles) law professor
Richard L. Hasen, who specializes in
election law, said the 11th Circuit's ruling
once again raises the question of whether the
Voting Rights Act reaches felon
discrimination claims when it can be shown
that such laws have a greater impact on
minorities. Hasen said the U.S. Supreme
Court declined last fall to hear cases
involving a split of opinion between the 2nd
Circuit, which held that New York's felon
disenfranchisement law did not violate the
act, and the 9th Circuit in San Francisco,
which held that a trial should be held to
determine whether a similar law in
Washington state violated the act. The
Loyola law professor noted that the
plaintiffs in the Florida case filed a friend-
of-the-court brief to the Supreme Court at
that time, "The plaintiffs in the Florida suit
told the Supreme Court, "Wait, don't take
those cases. We've got a case with a better
factual record,"' Hasen said. "I think the
stars are lined up now for a likely Supreme
Court review. "The case is Johnson v. Bush,
No. 02-14469 (11th Cir. April 12, 2005).
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"Disenfranchised Without Recourse?"
National Law Journal
Gary Young
May 31, 2004
A handful of decisions dealing with felon
disenfranchisement statutes show continuing
uncertainty about the extent of Congress'
authority to dictate anti-discrimination
policy to the states.
In April, the Second U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that a New York state law
depriving felons of the right to vote while
their sentences are running could not be
challenged under the Voting Rights Act
even if it has a disproportionate effect on the
African-American community. Muntaqim v.
Coombe, No. 01-7260.
In contrast, last year the ninth and eleventh
circuits ruled that such challenges should not
be dismissed out of hand, but require an
inquiry into "the totality of the
circumstances," particularly into possible
carry-over effects of discrimination in the
criminal justice system.
Two other circuits, the fourth and sixth-in
2000 and 1986 decisions, respectively-
assumed without discussion that felon
disenfranchisement statutes must pass
muster under the Voting Rights Act. But
since they ultimately found that the statutes
at issue were blameless, they may have
assumed so merely "for the sake of
argument."
Tea leaves
Although the Supreme Court has not spoken
on the precise issue at hand, it has looked at
related questions. In 1974's Richardson v.
Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, the court held that
felon disenfranchisement statutes do not on
their face violate the equal protection clause
because another section of the 14th
Amendment expressly exempted the states
from punishment for felon
disenfranchisement.
However, in 1984's Hunter v. Underwood,
471 U.S. 222, the court said that a facially
neutral Alabama felon disenfranchisement
law violated the 14th Amendment because
of evidence it was enacted after the Civil
War for the express purpose of depriving
African-Americans of the vote. [Neither
Richardson nor Hunter dealt with the Voting
Rights Act.]
In a 1980 case dealing with at-large election
systems, not felon disenfranchisement, a
plurality of the court said that the Voting
Rights Act is violated only when intent to
discriminate is proven. City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55. Congress responded to
Bolden by amending §f 2 of the act, codified
at 42 U.S.C. 1973, to encompass not only
intentional discrimination, but also state
action that "results" in an abridgement of the
right to vote on the basis of race. The
amendment also instructed courts to look at
the "totality of the circumstances."
Also relevant are a string of cases, including
Bd. of Trustees of the University ofAlabama
v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 [2001], in which
the Supreme Court has held that Congress'
14th Amendment enforcement powers vis-a-
vis the states do not come into play unless it
makes formal findings of a history of
discrimination.
In Muntaqim, the Second Circuit said that
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the act could not be extended to felon
disenfranchisement statutes in the absence
of Congress' express authorization, but also
hinted that Congress might then be
overstepping the line drawn in Garrett.
The Eleventh Circuit, in Johnson v. Gov. of
Fla., 353 F.3d 1287, and the 9th Circuit, in
Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009,
both pointed to the results-oriented language
of the 1982 amendments, but also seemed to
hedge their bets by pointing to possible
intentional discrimination at one step
removed [i.e., in the criminal justice
system].
Dissenters in both courts argued that the
majority opinions ignored the federal-state
line drawn in Garrett.
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"Felony Disenfranchisement in the United States"
The Sentencing Project
Overview
Since the founding of the country, most
states in the U.S. have enacted laws
disenfranchising convicted felons and ex-
felons. Today, almost all states have
disenfranchisement laws. In the last 30
years, due to the dramatic increased use and
expansion of the criminal justice system,
these laws have significantly affected the
political voice of many American
communities.
State Disenfranchisement Laws
48 states and the District of Columbia
prohibit inmates from voting while
incarcerated for a felony offense.
Only two states-Maine and Vermont-
permit inmates to vote.
35 states prohibit felons from voting while
they are on parole and 31 of these states
exclude felony probationers as well.
Seven states deny the right to vote to all ex-
offenders who have completed their
sentences. Seven others disenfranchise
certain categories of ex-offenders and/or
permit application for restoration of rights
for specified offenses after a waiting period
(e.g., five years in Delaware and Wyoming,
and three years in Maryland).
Each state has developed its own process of
restoring voting rights to ex-offenders but
most of these restoration processes are so
cumbersome that few ex-offenders are able
to take advantage of them.
Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement
An estimated 4.7 million Americans, or one
in forty-three adults, have currently or
permanently lost their voting rights as a
result of a felony conviction.
1.4 million African American men, or 13%
of black men, are disenfranchised, a rate
seven times the national average.
An estimated 676,730 women are currently
ineligible to vote as a result of a felony
conviction.
More than 2 million white Americans
(Hispanic and non-Hispanic) are
disenfranchised.
Over half a million women have lost their
right to vote.
In six states that deny the vote to
offenders, one in four black men
permanently disenfranchised.
ex-
is
Given current rates of incarceration, three in
ten of the next generation of black men can
expect to be disenfranchised at some point
in their lifetime. In states that
disenfranchise ex-offenders, as many as
40% of black men may permanently lose
their right to vote.
1.7 million disenfranchised persons are ex-
offenders who have completed their
sentences. The state of Florida had an
estimated 600,000 ex-felons who were
unable to vote in the 2000 presidential
election.
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Policy Changes
Alabama: In 2003, Governor Riley signed
into law a bill that permits most felons to
apply for a certificate of eligibility to
register to vote after completing their
sentence.
Connecticut: In May 2001, Governor
Rowland signed into law a bill that extends
voting rights to felons on probation. The
law is expected to make 36,000 persons
eligible to vote.
Delaware: Until recently, Delaware
imposed a lifetime voting ban for felons. In
June 2000, the General Assembly passed a
constitutional amendment restoring voting
rights to some ex-felons five years after the
completion of their sentence.
Florida: The Brennan Center and the
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law have a voting rights case pending in the
US District Court for the Southern District
of Florida challenging the constitutionality
of the voting laws that disenfranchise ex-
felons. Separate litigation filed by the
ACLU contends that the state Department of
Corrections is not fulfilling its obligation
under current law to aid ex-felons in seeking
clemency.
Kansas: In 2002, the legislature added
probationers to the category of excluded
felons.
Kentucky: In 2001, the legislature passed a
bill that requires that the Department of
Corrections inform and aid eligible
offenders in completing the restoration
process to regain their civil rights.
Maryland: In 2002, the legislature repealed
its lifetime ban on two-time ex-felons (with
the exception of felons with two violent
convictions) and imposed a three-year
waiting period after completion of sentence
before rights can be restored.
Massachusetts: Until the 2000 presidential
election, Massachusetts was one of three
states that allowed inmates to vote. On
November 7, 2000, the Massachusetts
electorate voted in favor of a constitutional
amendment, which strips persons
incarcerated for a felony offense of their
right to vote.
Nevada: In 2003, the state approved a
provision to automatically restore voting
rights for first-time nonviolent felons
immediately after completion of sentence.
New Mexico: In March 2001,
Legislature adopted a bill repealing
state's lifetime ban on ex-felon voting.
the
the
Pennsylvania: A Commonwealth Court
restored the right to vote to thousands of ex-
felons who, as a result, were entitled to vote
in the 2000 presidential election.
Virginia: The Virginia legislature passed a
law in 2000 enabling certain ex-felons to
apply to the circuit court for the restoration
of their voting rights five years after the
completion of their sentence; those
convicted of felony drug offenses must wait
seven years after completion. The circuit
court's decisions are subject to the
Governor's approval.
Wyoming: In March 2003, Governor
Freudenthal signed a bill to allow people
convicted of a nonviolent first-time felony to
apply for restoration of voting rights five
years after completion of sentence.
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Categories of Felons Disenfranchised Under State Law
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"Once a Felon, Never a Voter?"
National Journal
Megan Twohey
January 6, 2000
Thomas Johnson is a black resident of
Florida who was eager to vote for George
W. Bush for President. Johnson, who lives
in Gainesville with his wife and five
children, is executive director of a nonprofit
Christian residential program that helps
recently released state prison inmates re-
enter society. Johnson likes the Republican
principle of self-help, and supports the
party's stance against abortion rights.
But on Election Day, Johnson was unable to
vote. In 1992, he was convicted in New
York City of selling cocaine and carrying a
firearm without a license. When he moved
to Florida in 1996, he learned, much to his
dismay, that the state bans anyone convicted
of a felony from ever voting in any kind of
election unless he or she applies for and
receives an exemption from the state
clemency board-an arduous task.
"I've been in this community for five years,"
he said. "I'm a taxpayer. I help mold this
community through my work. The sheriff is
a friend of mine. But voting is the.power by
which you truly shape and mold, and I'm
being denied that. I watch my sons see me
stay home when my wife goes off to vote.
I'm appalled by it."
Johnson has plenty of company. Altogether,
500,000 Florida residents-4.6 percent of
the state's voting-age population-have
served time behind bars for various crimes
and thus are unable to vote because of the
ban, which has been on the law books since
1868. A disproportionate number of those
residents are black. Nearly 170,000 black
adult men in Florida-roughly 25 percent of
the state's black male residents-can't vote
because of a current or past conviction.
In September, the Brennan Center for
Justice at New York University School of
Law and the Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law, based in Washington,
filed a suit on behalf of Johnson and the
state's ex-felon population in U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Florida.
Like many Southern states, Florida during
Reconstruction adopted a ban on a former
felon's right to vote, which was aimed in
part at disenfranchising former slaves.
White lawmakers wrote those laws to
include what were then regarded as mainly
"black" crimes, such as rape and theft. The
civil rights lawyers assert that the ban
violates the 14th Amendment's equal-
protection clause, as well as the federal 1965
Voting Rights Act.
The Florida case highlights a growing
national concern: The increasing number of
disenfranchised Americans who are current
or former members of the exploding prison
population. More than 4 million
Americans-36 percent of whom are
African-American men-couldn't vote this
year as a result of state laws that ban voting
by convicted felons, according to the
Sentencing Project, a nonprofit, nonpartisan
organization in Washington that's pressing
for an overhaul of sentencing laws and
guidelines and conducts research on
criminal justice issues. Nearly three-
quarters of those felons are on probation or
parole; one-third have completed sentences.
Convicted felons and their allies in the civil
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rights community are challenging the laws
in state legislatures, Congress, and the
courts. They maintain that the bans are
racist, unconstitutional, and simply
irrational. These critics, who began their
effort in earnest two years ago, are
encountering formidable obstacles-
politicians of both major parties who are
uninterested in tinkering with the laws for
fear of appearing soft on crime, and
supporters of the restrictions, who insist that
the bans are legally secure and just. As a
result, advocates of change have made little
headway.
The disenfranchisement laws have surfaced
in waves over the past two centuries. Some
of the restrictions date to the first half of the
19th century, when society viewed voting as
a privilege, not a right. State and national
lawmakers at that time believed that
disenfranchising people who committed
serious crimes was a fair part of punishment.
After the Civil War, many Southern states
included criminal disenfranchisement, along
with poll taxes and literacy tests, in their
voting laws as a way of denying blacks the
vote. At the turn of the century, during the
Progressive era, a new logic emerged.
States outside of the South used
disenfranchisement laws as a way of
protecting the purity of the ballot box-or so
legislators said. Politicians assumed that
criminals would be more inclined to engage
in electoral fraud or to band together to
rewrite electoral laws even though, analysts
say, there was no empirical evidence to
support those assumptions.
During the civil rights movement of the
1960s and '70s, a few states relaxed their
restrictions. Then, in the 1980s, as crime
rates started to climb, many states revived or
broadened their bans.
Today, 48 states and the District of
Columbia have laws on the books that, in
one way or another, disenfranchise people
who've been convicted of felonies. Thirty-
two states deprive convicted offenders of the
vote while they're on parole, and 29 prohibit
offenders on probation from voting. In
addition to Florida, 12 states disenfranchise
for life ex-offenders who have completed
their sentences.
Yet certain states held out. Until recently,
four states-Maine, Massachusetts, Utah, and
Vermont-allowed all felons, even those in
prison, to vote. In a 1998 ballot initiative in
Utah, however, 80 percent voted to
disenfranchise felony inmates.
Massachusetts' voters did the same in
November.
Those who support voting bans insist that
people who are not willing to follow the law
should not be given the power to make the
law. "We don't let everyone vote," said
Roger Clegg, vice president and general
counsel for the Center for Equal
Opportunity, a conservative organization
based in Washington. "We require that
people meet a minimum level of
trustworthiness and loyalty to our system of
government. Consequently, we don't let
children, non-citizens, or people who are
certifiably insane vote. Just as these groups
don't meet the basic requirements, those
people who commit serious crimes don't
either."
In general, Republicans are not eager to
restore voting rights to ex-felons because
most of them are likely to vote for
Democrats. Jeff Manza, an associate
professor of sociology at Northwestern
University, has been studying hypothetical
voting habits of felons. "A large portion of
the current disenfranchised population is
low-income, has a low level of education,
and is single," Manza said. "And more than
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40 percent is black. When you take all of
these pieces of information and put them
together, you have a demographic group that
is inclined to be more favorable to the
Democrats."
Voting-rights advocates, however, argue
that, in addition to undermining the nation's
democratic principles, the restriction
prevents former offenders from fully
rejoining society. They say the bans are
particularly damaging today because more
and more people-especially blacks-are being
locked up for nonviolent drug offenses that
are classified as felonies.
These advocates are turning to state
legislatures to press for changes. Despite
only minor success, their cause may be
gaining momentum. Felon advocates scored
their biggest victory of the year in Delaware,
where the Legislature voted to scale back
the state's lifetime ban on voting; now
former offenders can vote again five years
after they have completed their sentences.
In Alabama and Connecticut, measures that
would shorten voting bans passed in the
House but were not taken up in the Senate.
"Some of the (Connecticut) senators were
concerned that they'd be perceived as soft
on crime," said Miles Rapoport, a former
secretary of state in Connecticut who is
executive director of Democracy Works, a
coalition of organizations that pushed for
changes.
"Gaining the franchise for any group is a
tricky thing," said Alexander Keyssar, a
professor of history and public policy at
Duke University and the author of The Right
to Vote: The Contested History of
Democracy in the United States. "No group
has been able to do so until it reaches that
historical moment in time when it has
political leverage or political allies. Felons
have neither. No one wants to run for office
saying, 'I gave the vote to the Boston
Strangler."'
Frustrated by the slow pace of change, John
Conyers, Jr. of Michigan, the senior
Democrat on the House Judiciary
Committee, and 37 co-sponsors proposed
legislation in March 1999 that would restore
the right to vote in federal elections to all
people convicted of a criminal offense who
are not behind bars. The Judiciary
Committee's Constitution Subcommittee
held hearings on the bill later in the year.
Despite compelling testimony on the
negative impact of disenfranchisement laws
on the black community, critics had a strong
hand to play: Article I, Section 2 of the
Constitution, which grants states the
authority to set voting requirements for
federal elections, and Section 2 of the 14th
Amendment, which explicitly allows states
to deny voting rights to people who commit
treason and other crimes. Conyers' bill has
remained stuck in committee. Challenging
the restrictive laws in the courts can be
tricky. Take the Florida case. In their
federal District Court case, attorneys for ex-
felons argue that the state's 1868 law was
intended to specifically disenfranchise
blacks and thus collides with the 14th
Amendment's equal-protection clause.
They also maintain that the law has had a
racially discriminatory impact, and therefore
violates the 1965 Voting Rights Act.
In a 1985 ruling, Hunter vs. Underwood, the
Supreme Court struck down an Alabama
disenfranchisement law because, the Justices
said, it had been created for purposes of
discrimination. In its 1974 Richardson vs.
Ramirez decision, however, the Court said
that such discriminatory intent must be
proven before felon disenfranchisement laws
can be struck down.
Because that intent was rooted in only a
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handful of Southern laws, conservative legal
scholars say that the majority of
disenfranchisement laws are legally secure.
Still, civil rights lawyers hope that the laws'
disproportionate impact on the black
community will become legal grounds for
striking them down. The case in Florida-
which is still pending-tests that claim. The
outcome could strengthen, or erode, the
underpinnings of other states'
disenfranchisement laws.
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"Perps and Politics"
National Review
October 18, 2004
Roger Clegg
In the overwhelming majority of our states,
you lose your right to vote, to one degree or
another, if you commit a felony. Brent
Staples, the "Editorial Observer" for the
New York Times, wrote recently that "legal
scholars attribute [felon disenfranchisement]
to this country's difficulties with race." This
summer the Washington Post said these laws
"are a vestige of a time when states sought
to discourage blacks from voting." USA
Today had earlier editorialized, "Voting
bans are rooted in the nation's racist past."
And recently a Reuters story (corrected after
I talked with them) asserted that these laws
"have roots in the post-Civil War 19th
century and were aimed at preventing black
Americans from voting."
But it is simply not true that the reason
felons are disenfranchised in the United
States is because of a desire to keep blacks
from voting. The reason our bien pensants
are making assertions to the contrary is
perhaps because they are being misled by
the well-funded and ubiquitous felon-
reenfranchisement movement. Yet the
falsity of these statements can be
demonstrated by simply reading the studies
published and relied on by the movement
itself
In a joint publication, "Losing the Vote," the
Sentencing Project and the Human Rights
Watch have acknowledged that
"disenfranchisement in the U.S. is a heritage
from ancient Greek and Roman traditions
carried into Europe." In Europe (including
England), the civil disabilities attached to
conviction for a felony were severe, and
"English colonists brought these concepts
with them to North America."
We can continue the historical narrative by
consulting another key source for the felon-
voting proponents: an article by professors
Christopher Uggen and Jeff Manza in the
American Sociological Review. It
concedes, "Restrictions [on felon voting]
were first adopted by some states in the
post-Revolutionary era, and by the eve of
the Civil War some two dozen states had
statutes barring felons from voting or had
felon disenfranchisement provisions in their
state constitutions." That means that over
70 percent of the states had these laws by
1861-when most blacks couldn't vote in
any case because they were still enslaved.
It is true that five southern states passed
race-targeted felon-disenfranchisement. laws
in the post-Reconstruction period from 1890
to 1910, according to an article in the Yale
Law Journal, another key movement source.
But by that time, according to a graphic in
the American Sociological Review article,
over 80 percent of the states in the U.S.
already had felon-disenfranchisement laws.
Alexander Keyssar's book The Right to
Vote-cited in the Uggen and Manza
piece-says that, outside the south, the
disenfranchisement laws "lacked socially
distinct targets and generally were passed in
a matter-of-fact fashion."
The five southern state laws that were race-
targeted are no longer on the books. Today,
most of the old Confederacy allows at least
some felons the vote and, conversely, many
of the states that disenfranchise all felons are
non-southern (for example, Iowa, Nevada,
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and Wyoming). Indeed, to quote Uggen and
Manza, "In general, some type of restriction
on felons' voting rights gradually came to be
adopted by almost every state, and at present
48 of the 50 states bar felons-in most cases
including those on probation or parole-
from voting."
The reason we don't let felons vote has
nothing to do with race and everything to do
with common sense. Individuals who have
shown they are unwilling too follow the law
cannot claim the right to make laws for the
rest of us. We don't let everyone vote-not
children, for instance, or noncitizens, or the
mentally incompetent. We have certain
minimum standards of trustworthiness
before we let people participate in the
serious business of self-government, and
people who commit serious crimes don't
meet those standards.
It is frequently asserted that felons released
from prison should be able to vote because
they have "paid their debt to society." But
the felon-vote movement will, if pressed,
admit that they think felons in prison should
be allowed to vote, too. And society is not
obliged to ignore someone's criminal record
just because he has been released from
prison. Felons are barred by federal law
from possessing firearms, for example,
It is true that some felons-say, someone
who wrote a bad check decades ago and has
led an exemplary life since then-ought to
have their voting rights restored, but these
determinations should be made on a case-
by-case, not a wholesale, basis. It is also
true that these laws have come to have a
disproportionate impact on blacks, but this
was not deliberate and will cease once a
disproportionate number of felonies are no
longer committed by blacks.
The irony is that the people whose votes will
be diluted the most if felons are re-
enfranchised are the law-abiding citizens in
communities with a high proportion of
felons in them. These citizens, who are also
most frequently the victims of crime, are of
course themselves disproportionately poor
and minority. But somehow the bien
pensants always forget them.
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"Re-Enfranchising Felons"
American Spectator
March 2, 2005
Shawn Macomber
If the price of getting a bill that addresses
some Republican concerns about voter fraud
(most notably an ID requirement) is the re-
enfranchisement of felons who have
completed their sentences, it should be paid
gladly-and not simply because it's some
Machiavellian bargaining chip. It also
happens to be the right thing to do.
Close to five million Americans are
currently barred from voting because of
felony convictions. Of this number, nearly
two million have completely paid their debt
to society in the form of time served behind
bars, parole, and probation. There is no
legitimate moral argument for denying those
who have regained their status as free
citizens through public penance the most
basic right of a citizen.
It has been made painfully obvious both
why Democrats are pushing re-
enfranchisement as well as why Republicans
oppose it. Two of the Democratic senators
who walked the Count Every Vote Act of
2005 to the Senate floor last week-John
Kerry and Hillary Clinton-both desperately
want to be president and believe there is a
Democratic advantage inherent in the felon
vote.
Clearly, Republicans have sensed this as
well. Dave Gibson, writing for American
Daily, noted that Clinton is pushing this bill
primarily "because she knows that 99.9
percent of [felons] would vote Democratic
and would be just the boost she needs for
her 2008 Presidential bid." Further, and
larger in scope, when the Chairman of the
Alabama Republican Party, Marty Connors,
got wind of a 2003 bill to loosen restrictions
on felons' voting rights he was quite
forthright as to why he opposed such a
measure.
"There's no more anti-Republican bill than
this," Connors said. "As frank as I can be,
we're opposed to it because felons don't tend
to vote Republican."
Well, allow me to engage in a bit of
frankness myself: That is nothing
approaching a good enough reason to
disenfranchise a sizable chunk of the
American population. The true measure of a
principled person or party is not and will
never be determined by its willingness to
take only those actions from which they
themselves benefit. It is measured by
standing up for what is right whatever the
consequences may be.
If Republicans can get a few of their own
ballot box reforms instituted through
Democratic efforts to re-enfranchise ex-
felons, great. If not, it needs to be done
anyway.
Further, there is evidence suggesting that the
American public at large does not take such
a political view of the issue. A July 2002
Harris poll found that 80 percent of
Americans believe that all ex-felons who
have completed their sentences should be
allowed to vote. Sixty percent believed that
felons finished with their sentence but on
probation or parole likewise should have the
right to vote.
Aside from the political implications,
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opposition to re-enfranchisement seems to
rest on two foundations. The first is
tradition. Felons have been disenfranchised
since the birth of the republic, so why
change things up now? And it's true. But it
is also worth remembering that these
restrictions were first instituted during a
time when only somewhere in the
neighborhood of six percent of the citizenry
could vote. (Obviously, this does not
include the one million slaves held at the
time could not even claim their own bodies
as property, never mind the sort of property
that "earned" you voting rights back then.)
Voting laws have changed considerably
since then, with barely any other restriction
left standing.
It's also true that we restrict gun rights for
ex-felons-something that is much more
popular but likewise of dubious value with
regard to nonviolent offenders.
Nevertheless, these restrictions are not one
and the same. A gun is not a ballot, and
confusing the two is not helpful in
facilitating an honest debate on the issue.
The second foundation is a disturbing
element of dehumanization which turns
every felon into something more akin to a
vile lecherous beast than a human being. As
noted above, this is not the view of anything
approaching the majority of Americans.
Still, there's a dripping sarcasm that runs
through nearly every polemic issued against
re-enfranchisement suggesting that those
who support such a policy want to aid and
abet child molesters, terrorists, and
murderers.
But a felony is not what it once was in
America, as is made painfully obvious by
the 600 percent jump in incarceration rates
over the last 30 years. Indeed, it can and
should be argued that a standard which
permanently disenfranchises anyone who
commits a non-violent felony-of which
there are now legion-is cruel and unusual.
Can any reasonable person say a non-violent
drug offender should have his voting rights
curtailed for the rest of his life? How about
someone who once wrote a series of bad
checks? Or even on the violent end of
things, once engaged in an ill advised bar
fight? Are we really ready to tell these
people no matter what they do they can
never be trusted by society again? That
there is no way to reform after even a minor
youthful indiscretion?
Hyperbolically screaming, opponents of re-
enfranchisement for ex-felons make
monsters out of men, because it lends easy
justification to an abridgement of rights that
would not hold up under individual scrutiny.
The truth is, the real monsters are largely
either still in jail or under onerous probation
requirements and will not likely be able to
vote anytime soon. It's high time the rest of
these men and women who have served their
time are released from the caricature. The
punishment does not fit the crime, and no
matter which way it is spun, permanent
disenfranchisement will never be compatible
with a just society.
This article appeared
http://www.spectator. org.
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